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A FEMINIST FRAMING OF NON-CONSENSUAL PORNOGRAPHY 
 




Every Framing theory tells us that events or issues can be moved 
about and placed into different fields of meaning.1 How we name and 
frame issues matters.2 This is particularly evident for issues that touch 
the lives of marginalized or subordinated groups, because power is an 
understood element in the framing process.3 Those in power often give 
the loudest or first voice to an issue, thereby picking a frame and often 
co-opting it.4 Consider, for example, how President Trump came under 
fire for his decision to hound former Miss Universe contestant, Alicia 
Machado, and for remarks he made in a 2005 “Access Hollywood” 
video. To begin, Alicia Machado made a campaign video for Hillary 
Clinton in which she accused Donald Trump of misogynistic treatment 
of her during her reign as Miss America.5 President Trump reacted with 
a series of early morning tweets, the last of which described Ms. 
Machado as “disgusting” and suggested that the public “check out [her] 
sex tape and past.”6 Later in the campaign, a recording of a conversation 
                                                 
* Director of the Domestic Violence Clinic, Practitioner in Residence at American 
University Washington College of Law. First and foremost, I wish to thank a 
particular client who must remain nameless, but whose experiences inspired this 
piece. If advocates and law makers can be as deliberate, determined, and decent as 
her, then there will be progress. The author would also like to thank Phyllis 
Goldfarb, contributors at the New York University School of Law Clinical Law 
Review Workshop and the Mid-Atlantic Writers Workshop, as well as participants in 
the Works in Progress series at the Clinical Section of the American Association of 
Law Schools for their comments on earlier drafts of this article. 
1 JENNY KITZINGER, FRAMING ABUSE 133–35 (2004) (describing how frames lead to 
exaggerations or absences and effects one’s ability to “confront” a story). 
2 Id.; Marie Hardin & Erin Whiteside, Framing Through a Feminist Lens, in DOING 
NEWS FRAMING ANALYSIS: EMPIRICAL AND THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES 314 (Paul 
D’Angelo & Jim A. Kuypers eds., 2009). 
3 Hardin & Whiteside, supra note 2, at 314; Kimberlé Crenshaw, The Urgency of 
Intersectionality, TED (Oct. 27, 2009), 
https://www.ted.com/talks/kimberle_crenshaw_the_urgency_of_intersectionality/det
ails, at 9:05 (discussing the power of frames in problem identification). 
4 Crenshaw, supra note 3, at 4:07. 
5 Michael Barbaro & Megan Twohey, Shamed and Angry: Alicia Machado, a Miss 
Universe Mocked by Donald Trump, N. Y. TIMES (Sept. 27, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/28/us/politics/alicia-machado-donald-trump.html. 
6 Donald Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Sept. 30, 2016, 2:30 AM), 
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/781788223055994880?ref_src=twsrc%5
Etfw&ref_url=http%3A%2F%2F; see also Ben Mathis-Lilley, Trump Tweeted at 
5:30 am About Alicia Machado’s Alleged “Sex Tape,” SLATE (Sept. 30, 2016 9:35 
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caught on hot-mic was leaked to the press.7 In it Donald Trump is heard 
bragging that he can grab women “by the pussy” and kiss them without 
consent, because he is a celebrity.8 His remarks were named demeaning 
and his remarks were named locker room talk.9 And so, the American 
public found ourselves discussing whether a nominee’s instincts to 
engage in locker room talk while on a job make him fit for President. 
Some asked whether he had true regard for women, for our “precious 
girls” and our “wives and daughters.”10  
Trump’s remarks, his actions, and his decisions could have been 
framed as something else. They could have been framed as evidence of 
our society’s acceptance of gender based violence. And indeed, this 
frame would have proven to be prophetic given the outcome of the 
election. This alternate frame is less interested in what Trump’s 
behavior says about him and more interested in what it says about all of 




7 The Young Turks, Trump Hot Mic LEAKED: “Grab ‘Em By The Pu$$y,” 
YOUTUBE (Oct. 7, 2016), youtube.com/watch?v=su-Rt4QJZ08. 
8 David A. Fahrethold, Trump Recorded Having Extremely Lewd Conversation 




9 Steph Solis & Josh Hafner, The Phrase of the Night? “Locker Room Talk,” USA 
TODAY (Oct. 10, 2016), 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/onpolitics/2016/10/10/hillary-
clinton-donald-trump-debate-by-the-numbers/91834986/ (noting that then-
candidate Trump used the phrase “respect for women” five times during the 
second presidential debate). 
10 See Mitt Romney (@MittRomney), TWITTER (Oct. 7, 2016, 5:10 PM), 
https://twitter.com/MittRomney/status/784546373525966849; Jeb Bush (@jebbush), 
TWITTER (Oct. 7, 2016, 4:05 PM), 
https://twitter.com/JebBush/status/784530223605903360. 
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us.11 Asking different questions inspires different conversations.12 The 
gender-violence frame would lead us to discuss where we are as a 
people when allegations regarding women’s sexual choices13 and 
visuals of grabbing women’s private bodies are available weapons in 
the arsenal of men; though notably, I must add, white men. Apparently, 
one can use these weapons to get a few laughs when one feels 
chummy.14 One can use them to distract when they feel cornered or 
called out.15 President Trump is not alone in this knowledge.16 He was 
                                                 
11 Kimberlé Crenshaw, from University of California, Los Angeles School of Law, 
was among the first legal scholars to articulate how framing frustrates problem 
identification. See L.P. Drew, Gender Gap: Kimberl� Crenshaw ’81 on the 
Intersection of Racism and Sexism, CORNELL ALUMNI MAG., July– Aug. 2016, at 22, 
23. In several recent lectures, including one attended by the author, Crenshaw has 
used an extended metaphor applying the framing principles to the importance of 
looking at potential environmental causes when discussing sick farm animals. See 
Taylor Galla, Kimberlé Crenshaw Speaks at Scripps, THE SCRIPPS VOICE (May 7, 
2015), http://www.thescrippsvoice.com/articles/2015/5/7/kimberl-crenshaw-speaks-
at-scripps (“[Crenshaw] then began to explain that facts and figures surrounding 
these issues mean nothing without the proper frames. To illustrate, Crenshaw 
showed the audience a picture of cows grazing in a field surrounded by smoke and 
smog from factories. She asked who we would fault for the sick cows, and said that 
many people would blame the farmer and not feel personally connected to the 
problem. She then showed another photo zoomed into the smoke and smog from the 
factories to emphasize the health factor that may have been ignored by viewers in the 
previous photo, and said that with this photo, people would have a different answer 
to whether they are connected to or implicated by the problem. Because of the 
emphasis of the smog which people created, they would see their life habits and their 
own health to be connected to these cows.”). For another description of this lecture 
delivered at Brandeis University, see Jocelyn Gould, Kimberlé Crenshaw Accepts 
Gittler Prize For Career Works, THE JUSTICE (Oct. 31, 2017 6:00 AM), 
http://www.thejustice.org/article/2017/10/kimberl-crenshaw-accepts-gittler-prize-
for-career-works. 
12 Id.; Hardin & Whiteside, supra note 2, at 314. 
13 Machado denied the existence of a sex tape, calling Trump’s remarks “cheap 
likes with bad intentions.” See Carolina Moreno, Alicia Machado Speaks Out After 
Trump’s “Sex Tape” Accusation, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 3, 2016 1:00 PM), 
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/alicia-machado-speaks-out-after-donald-
trumps-sex-tape-accusation_us_57f26f75e4b0c2407cdebe04. 
14 See The Young Turks, supra note 7. 
15 Trump’s tweets were seen as reaction to Hillary Clinton discussing Machado’s 
experience of being called “Miss Piggy” and “Miss Housekeeping” by Trump. See 
Mathis-Lilley, supra note 5. 
16 See Caitlin Dewey, The Only Guide to Gamergate You Will Ever Need to Read, 
WASH. POST (Oct. 14, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-
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not, after all, talking to himself when he was discussing sexual exploits 
and conquests.17 He was on a bus, engaged in active repartee with a 
minor-league celebrity: He was at work and he was not the only one 
laughing.18 And President Trump did not utter his accusations of 
Machado’s sex tapes into the darkness at 5:30 a.m.19 He launched his 
voice through social media.20 33,181 people have “liked” this tweet21 
and 17,355 people shared it.22 We have an appetite for this hostility, 
which is worrisome and shameful to say the least.23 
Our society’s acceptance of, and appetite for, gender based 
violence stems from unbridled entitlement to possess, occupy, and 
critique women’s bodies and their sexual selves.24 The culmination of 
                                                 
intersect/wp/2014/10/14/the-only-guide-to-gamergate-you-will-ever-need-to-
read/?utm_term=.7e02cc7a6aa4 (discussing the onslaught of virtual harassment of 
women in the gaming industry, referred to a “Gamergate”); Ashley Judd, Forget 
Your Team: Your Online Violence Toward Girls and Women is What Can Kiss My 
Ass, MIC (Mar. 19, 2015), https://mic.com/articles/113226/forget-your-team-your-
online-violence-toward-girls-and-women-is-what-can-kiss-my-ass#.PRXwRvLlQ 
(describing the social media harassment actress Ashley Judd faced after posting a 
negative tweet during a basketball game). 
17 See The Young Turks, supra note 7. 
18 See id. Billy Bush, the other voice on the tape, was fired from NBC’s 
“TODAY”, where he had recently become a host, shortly after the tape was 
released. See NBC NEWS, Billy Bush Leaving TODAY Effective Immediately (Oct. 
17, 2016 7:55 PM), http://www.foxnews.com/entertainment/2016/10/18/nbc-news-
fires-billy-bush-after-lewd-donald-trump-tape-airs.html. 
19 Mathis-Lilley, supra note 5. 
19 Id. 




Note, these numbers reflect retweets and shares as of December 2017. Numbers may 
have changed since the original incident. 
22 Id. 
23 See, e.g., Dewey, supra note 16; Judd, supra note 16. 
24 This ranges from President Trump’s tweets to ubiquity and violence of rape 
culture. See Amy Ellis Nutt, A Shocking Number of College Men Surveyed Admit 
Coercing a Partner into Sex, WASH. POST (June 5, 2016), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/to-your-health/wp/2016/06/03/more-than-
half-of-college-athletes-surveyed-at-one-university-admit-coercing-a-partner-into-
sex/?utm_term=.50beffba4529 (discussing the prevalence of sexual violence among 
male college athletes and the acceptance of rape myth among male college athletes). 
This is embodied in the letter by the father of Brock Turner, a college student 
convicted of assaulting a woman at a fraternity party in 2015, which describes rape 
Donohue 
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the many voices articulating such gender based violence in the many 
and varied settings in which they speak, gives rise to communities of 
people who troll and harass female celebrities and activists, not with 
critiques of their work, but with calls for their rape.25 Similarly, there is 
a thriving market for Non-Consensual Pornography, a market designed 
to provide space and voice to those who wish to post naked images and 
sexual content about others in order to shame or punish them.  
Non-Consensual Pornography as a concept and a problem is 
finally starting to receive attention.26 The telling of the story goes 
something like this: “girl meets guy, girls and guy have a relationship, 
girl takes naked pictures for the guy, guy turns out to be a scumbag who 
then posts her pics on the Internet.”27 Indeed, Non-Consensual 
Pornography was originally termed Revenge Porn.28 As is common with 
other sexually assaultive language or behavior, the popular frame29 for 
those speaking out against Non-Consensual Pornography features 
                                                 
as “20 minutes of action,” rather than a manifestation of a young man’s willingness 
to take and hurt. See Letter from Dan A. Turner to Judge Aaron Persky, Superior 
Court of California, County of Santa Clara; 
https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/2852614-Letter-from-Brock-Turner-s-
Father.html; see also Emma Gray, This Letter from The Stanford Sex Offender’s Dad 
Epitomizes Rape Culture, HUFFINGTON POST (June 6, 2016, 1:07 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/brock-turner-dad-letter-is-rape-culture-in-a-
nutshell_us_57555bace4b0ed593f14cb30. 
25 See Dewey supra note 16; Judd, supra note 16. 
26 See, e.g., Last Week Tonight with John Oliver: Online Harassment (HBO 
broadcast June 21, 2015); Arthur Chu, Mr. Obama, Tear Down This Liability Shield, 
TECHCRUNCH (Sept. 29, 2015), http://techcrunch.com/2015/09/29/mr-obama-tear-
down-this-liability-shield/; Sarah A. O’Brien, Will Hillary Clinton Be the One to 
Crack Down on Revenge Porn?, CNNTECH (Aug. 26, 2016, 11:59 AM), 
http://money.cnn.com/2016/08/26/technology/hillary-clinton-revenge-porn/. 
27 Nicole Chung, An Interview with Sarah Jeong, Author of The Internet of Garbage, 
THE TOAST (July 23, 2015), http://the-toast.net/2015/07/23/an-interview-with-sarah-
jeong/. 
28 Id. See also Mary Anne Franks, How to Defeat ‘Revenge Porn’: First, Recognize 
It’s About Privacy, Not Revenge, HUFFINGTON POST (June 22, 2015), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/mary-anne-franks/how-to-defeat-revenge-
porn_b_7624900.html (“It's colloquially referred to as ‘revenge porn,’ but that term 
is misleading. While a number of cases do involve bitter exes whose express purpose 
is to harm or harass their former partners, many perpetrators don't know their victims 
at all. A more accurate term is nonconsensual pornography, defined as the 
distribution of private, sexually explicit material without consent.”). 
29 Hardin & Whiteside, supra note 2, at 312. 
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people asking each other “what would you do if this were your 
daughter?”30 The frame suggests that the problem is defined as bad 
boyfriends hurting our daughters. To fix this problem we see a legal 
landscape dominated by a focus on punishing the poster31 and debating 
how we may or may not need to educate our daughters about the risks 
of taking or sharing nude pictures.32 We remain relatively blind to how 
clumsily certain civil remedies map on to the problem of Non-
Consensual Pornography and the problem of third party liability shields 
for the Internet Service Providers who host the content.33 
Meanwhile, Non-Consensual Pornography is a more nuanced 
and insidious problem. The damage done by any perpetrator moves 
beyond story tale betrayal and a ruined love affair. Rather, subjects34 of 
Non-Consensual Pornography suffer lasting consequences for their 
sense of privacy, safety, reputation, and control.35 This damage may 
                                                 
30 Compare Noel Brinkerhoff, 23 Women Sue GoDaddy over “Revenge Porn” Site, 
ALLGOV (Jan. 27, 2013), http://www.allgov.com/news/controversies/23-women-sue-
godaddy-over-revenge-porn-site-130127?news=846869, with Scott Wise & Joe St. 
George, Va. Nursing Student Fights Back After ‘Revenge Porn’ Video Hits Internet, 
CBS 6 (Jan. 14, 2014), http://wtvr.com/2014/01/14/revenge-porn-bill/ (noting the 
comments to the articles many of which ask the “what if it were your daughter” 
question; and other of which proclaim that the subjects of the attack need to “learn 
something,” be mindful of their reputations, or be open to the risky consequences of 
the actions they took). 
31 Using “poster” here to refer to an individual who posted Non-Consensual 
Pornography content on the internet. 
32 TOMMY WELLS, CHAIRPERSON, COUNCIL OF THE D.C. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY 
AND PUB. SAFETY COMM., R. ON BILL 20-902 THE “CRIMINALIZATION OF NON-
CONSENSUAL PORNOGRAPHY ACT OF 2014” 3–4 (2014) (demonstrating a focus in the 
problem identification stage on revenge porn in the context of a dating relationship 
or former dating relationship; and concluding in the “[i]nadequacy of current legal 
remedies” section, that “criminal penalties may provide deterrence”). See, e.g., Ken 
White, Pepperdine Law School Debate on Criminalizing Revenge Porn, POPE HAT 
(Apr. 16, 2015), https://popehat.com/2015/04/16/pepperdine-law-school-debate-on-
criminalizing-revenge-porn/ (showing an example of a blog post and prototypical 
reaction to the issues). See also supra note 16 (showing other examples of articles 
and reader comments); PEGGY ORENSTEIN, GIRLS & SEX: NAVIGATING THE 
COMPLICATED NEW LANDSCAPE, 21–24 (2016). 
33 Danielle Keats Citron & Mary Anne Franks, Criminalizing Revenge Porn, 49 
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 345, 359 (2014). 
34 This paper consciously refers to these individuals as subjects, not victims. 
35 DANIELLE KEATS CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE 81–82 (2014). 
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well be instigated by a singular poster36 but it is perpetuated and 
consumed by a culture that not only tolerates, but demands, the 
commodification, humiliation, and subjugation of women. To fix this 
problem we must consider a larger system of markets, incentives, and 
ownership to determine how to offer subjects of Non-Consensual 
Pornography power and control. 
This article argues that the “daughter” frame is available and 
tempting because it essentializes women and reacts to sexual content in 
a tired and familiar way.37 This article seeks to frame Non-Consensual 
Pornography differently, rejecting the daughter frame. Critical theories 
tell us that if we ask different questions we see different possibilities or 
angles.38 In challenging the daughter frame and critiquing the current 
landscape, I am assisted by a feminist perspective, a perspective that 
rejects “‘objectivity’ and ‘rationality’ as neutral,” acknowledges a 
patriarchal system, and advocates for change.39 
Part I of this article proposes to further define and clarify Non-
Consensual Pornography.40 Part II offers an illustration of and 
experience with Non-Consensual Pornography to dismantle the 
“daughter” frame for Non-Consensual Pornography.41 This section 
introduces a feminist perspective to argue that the “daughter” frame 
distracts from a critical understanding of the harm of Non-Consensual 
Pornography thus foreclosing an opportunity to discuss and debate the 
legal remedies and reforms that might empower those targeted by Non-
Consensual Pornography.42 Part III will highlight the trends in the 
emerging area of law by offering a brief overview of the popular 
criminal response to Non-Consensual Pornography and then employing 
a feminist lens to enliven critiques of it.43 Part IV aims to initiate under-
                                                 
36 It is important to note that there is not a typical profile of, or approach for, a given 
perpetrator. 
37 E.g., Emily Peck, You Don’t Need a Daughter to Know Trump Bragging About 
Sexual Assault Is Vile, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 8, 2016, 12:43 AM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/you-dont-need-a-daughter-to-know-trumps-
comments-on-sexual-assault-are-vile_us_57f85be0e4b0e655eab483af (showing how 
the “daughter” framing is common when discussing sexual violence). 
38 Kimberlé Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, 
and Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241, 1242–44 (1991). 
39 Hardin & Whiteside, supra note 2, at 316, 318.  
40 See infra Part I.  
41 See infra Part II.  
42 See infra Part II.  
43 See infra Part III.  
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developed conversations about civil remedies for Non-Consensual 
Pornography and Sexualized Cyber Harassment.44 This section will 
describe the theoretical framework for civil claims and the available, yet 
inadequate, take down protocols of the Digital Millennium Copyright 
Act (DCMA).45 This part employs a feminist jurisprudence to evaluate 
the potential and limitations of claims including, right to privacy, right 
to publicity, and copyright while paying particular attention to the third 
party liability shields of the Communication Decency Act.46 The article 
concludes with an invitation for continued conversations and advocacy 
in regards to take-down protocols and third party liability for Internet 
Service Providers who host Non-Consensual Pornography and 
Sexualized Cyber Harassment.47  
 
I. NON-CONSENSUAL PORNOGRAPHY DEFINED AND DESCRIBED 
 
“Cyber harassment involves threats of violence, privacy invasions, 
reputation-harming lies, calls for strangers to physically harm victims, 
and technological attacks.”48 Non-Consensual Pornography is a brand 
of cyber harassment in which the violence and invasion involves posting 
nude or sexually explicit images49 without the consent of the person in 
the image.50 Non-Consensual Pornography is also the most explicit 
example of the gendered nature of cyber harassment generally.51 The 
line between Non-Consensual Pornography specifically, and sexually 
explicit or gendered harassment generally, is a difficult (and arguably 
arbitrary) one to draw.52 In a recent survey, for example, only about 
25% of participants indicated that they experienced “Non-Consensual 
Pornography” harassment; yet when asked to comment on the “focus 
and method of harassment” many respondents indicated that they were 
                                                 
44 See infra Part IV.  
45 See infra Part IV. 
46 See infra Part IV. 
47 See infra Part V.  
48 See CITRON, supra note 35, at 81–82. 
49 Chung, supra note 27. 
50 CITRON, supra note 35, at 17.  
51 Id.  
52 DAN TAUBE ET AL., WITHOUT MY CONSENT, PRELIMINARY REPORT: WITHOUT MY 
CONSENT SURVEY OF ONLINE STALKING, HARASSMENT AND VIOLATIONS OF 
PRIVACY (Sept. 2014), 
http://withoutmyconsent.org/sites/default/files/wmc_prelim_survey_report.pdf. 
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harassed by “sexist statements,” “statements attacking gender,” or 
“statements attacking sexual orientation.”53 So while certain subjects of 
harassment may have avoided their naked images appearing on screen, 
it was open season for commentary on their gender and sexual choices.54 
Many of the criminal laws for Non-Consensual Pornography concern 
themselves with Non-Consensual Pornography most strictly defined, 
which is to say, where the perpetrator uses nude images of the victim to 
affect the harassment.55 The article looks beyond this strict definition, 
to consider the use of images generally, not just nude images where 
those images are linked to sexualized statements and are used without 
the consent of the subject of the image.  
Non-Consensual Pornography can take varying forms, but it starts 
with somebody uploading an image of their target without that person’s 
consent.56 These images are often nude photographs or photographs 
accompanied by highly sexualized content.57 Posters may choose to 
upload the images to any location on the web, a social media page such 
as Facebook or LinkedIn, a pornographic website, or an image board. 58 
Once an image has been uploaded it will be viewed thousands of times; 
it can be shared and moved from one website to another.59 Often times 
Non-Consensual Pornography is a tool in “trolling” campaigns.60 
Trolling is an internet slang term for the act of posting inflammatory 
material for the expressed purpose of provoking an argument or 
response, perhaps from your target, or from the community at large.61 
Non-Consensual Pornography is also often used as an act of “doxing” 
an individual.62 Doxing is, alarmingly, where the person posting 
                                                 
53 Id. 
54 Id. 
55 See State Revenge Porn Laws, C.A. GOLDBERG LAW, 
http://www.cagoldberglaw.com/states-with-revenge-porn-laws/ (last visited Dec. 26, 
2017). 
56 Citron & Franks, supra note 33, at 346. 
57 Id. 
58 Id. at 353. 
59 Franks, supra note 28.  
60 See Noreen Malone, Zoë and the Trolls, N.Y. MAG. (July 26, 2017), 
http://nymag.com/selectall/2017/07/zoe-quinn-surviving-gamergate.html. 
61 See Jennifer Golbeck, Internet Trolls are Narcissist, Psychopaths, and Sadists, 
PSYCH. TODAY (Sept. 18, 2014), https://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/your-
online-secrets/201409/internet-trolls-are-narcissists-psychopaths-and-sadists. 
62 See Joey L. Blanch & Wesley H. Hsu, An Introduction to Violent Crime on the 
Internet, THE U.S. ATT’YS.’ BULL., May 2016 at 5–6. 
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material will publish private or identifying material about a person, or 
the person posting an image will request more details or information on 
the subject from others.63 The poster may be a revengeful ex, an 
underhanded hacker, or a cruel stranger.64 Some hosts of websites, some 
of which are dedicated to Non-Consensual Pornography, explicitly prey 
on perversions and hostilities of various types of perpetrators.65 Other 
sites and image boards turn a blind eye to the obvious use of their 
forum.66 
A common reaction to Non-Consensual Pornography and 
Sexualized Cyber Harassment is for people to ask one another “what 
would you do if this were your daughter?”67 But why are we asking this 
                                                 
63 See id. (“Another form of cyberharassment is ‘doxing,’ which refers to 
broadcasting personally identifiable information about an individual on the 
Internet. It can expose the victim to an anonymous mob of countless harassers, 
calling their phones, sending them email, and even appearing at the victim’s 
home.”). 
64 See Franks, supra note 28; see also Tara West, Playmate Dani Mathers May Face 
Criminal Charges for Shaming, Posting Nude Photo of Woman in Gym Locker 
Room, INQUISITR (July 16, 2015), http://www.inquisitr.com/3314613/playmate-dani-
mathers-may-face-criminal-charges-for-shaming-posting-nude-photo-of-woman-in-
gym-locker-room/. 
65 Indeed, depending on one defines the perpetrator of Non-Consensual 
Pornography, one comes out differently on believing a host of Non-Consensual 
Pornography is a perpetrator of Non-Consensual Pornography. Therefore, for the 
purpose of clarity of actors this article will identify those people who make an 
original post as a poster and those entities that solicit, host, or archive and given post 
as the host. See, e.g., Abby Ohlheiser, Revenge Porn Purveyor Hunter Moore is 
Sentenced to Prison, WASH. POST (Dec. 3, 2015), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-intersect/wp/2015/12/03/revenge-porn-
purveyor-hunter-moore-is-sentenced-to-prison/. Moore created a website where he 
“publicly posted nude or compromising photos” without consent. Id. His sentence 
was a result of a plea deal for unrelated charges. Id. 
66 See, e.g., Caitlin Dewey, Absolutely Everything You Need to Know to Understand 
4chan, the Internet’s Own Bogeyman, WASH. POST (Sept. 25, 2014), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-intersect/wp/2014/09/25/absolutely-
everything-you-need-to-know-to-understand-4chan-the-internets-own-
bogeyman/?utm_term=.19afbacc3f83 (describing use of 4chan.com, an image board 
site that is “responsible for some of the largest hoaxes, cyberbullying incidents and 
Internet pranks” in recent years.). 
67 See supra note 16 and accompanying text. This is also reflected in the author’s 
own experience speaking with law enforcement officer, probation officers, and 
prosecutors across several jurisdictions. Without fail, each conversation includes a 
statement about the victims as daughters. See also CITRON, supra note 35, at 20–21 
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question? The “daughter” frame is available and tempting because it 
essentializes68 women and sex: a young woman has made a questionable 
choice around sex and some trouble has now befallen her. Consider, for 
example, that some jurisdictions define the crime of Non-Consensual 
Pornography as depicting the images of “a current or former sexual or 
intimate partner.”69 Here the criminal code is communicating the 
(noble, perhaps) notion that those in intimate partnerships should be 
have their consent and their notion of intimacy exploited by their 
partner.70 Yet, the law limits the criminal law intervention to those 
scenarios where there was an intimate relationship.71 Moreover, the 
notion that the law’s concern should be to regulate or intervene in sexual 
relationships, distances the response from one that understands that 
Non-Consensual Pornography is not just its unwanted intrusion on 
people’s sex lives.72 It is a systemic, marketable attack on a person’s 
body and sexual identity; specifically, most commonly, women’s bodies 
and sexual identities.73  
Early feminist critiques of pornography generally sounded a similar, 
if not more piercing, kind of alarm: pornography subordinates its 
                                                 
(describing the typical law enforcement attitude of telling victims “to turn off their 
computers because ‘boys will be boys’”). 
68 There are varying definitions of essentialism in feminist legal theory. In the most 
basic sense, however, “essentialism assumes that all women share the same inherent 
characteristics.” Jane Wong, The Anti-Essentialism v. Essentialism Debate in 
Feminist Legal Theory: The Debate and Beyond, 5 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 
273, 275 (1999). 
69 H.B. 2107, 2014-115, Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. 2014 (Pa. 2014).  
70 John Kopp, Lawmakers Seek Wider Net for Pennsylvania’s ‘Revenge Porn’ Law, 
PHILLY VOICE (Aug. 17, 2015), http://www.phillyvoice.com/lawmakers-changes-
revenge-porn-law/. 
71 Id.  
72 Id. 
73 See Dan Tynan, Revenge Porn: The Industry Profiting from Online Abuse, THE 
GUARDIAN (Apr. 26, 2016), 
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/apr/26/revenge-porn-nude-photos-
online-abuse (“Revenge porn is just one of the many ways sites are profiting from 
internet abuse. And even sites that do not profit directly may benefit in other ways 
from the attention online abuse can bring.”); Julie Bort, Inside the Sleazy World of 
Reputation Management, Where People Pay to Control What You See on the 
Internet, BUS. INSIDER (Dec. 25, 2013), http://www.businessinsider.com/reputation-
management-2013-12.  
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subjects; subjects are dehumanized, objectified, and commodified.74 
While this article does not aim to center itself with the larger debate 
about whether a woman can ever consent to pornography, it does 
concern itself with Non-Consensual Pornography’s dehumanization 
and objectification of its subjects. It worries that this dehumanizing and 
objectification is carried out with words and images that declare the 
presentation to be a presentation of sex; as if the depiction is the type of 
sex or sexual relationship that the subject of the Non-Consensual 
Pornography would choose for themselves.75 When lawmakers look for 
the origin of the relationship between a subject of Non-Consensual 
Pornography and the poster, or the original act of sexual intimacy 
between the two parties, lawmakers are complicit in a deceit.76 Put 
another way, they are complicit in the fiction that the Non-Consensual 
Pornography depictions have anything at all to do with the subject, her 
history, and her choices- sexual or otherwise.77 An insistence that Non-
Consensual Pornography is singularly about “daughters” safety in their 
sexual relationships, does not frame the matter widely enough to 
imagine all the people who are subjects of Non-Consensual 
Pornography, to imagine the nature or scope of the way in which they 
are harmed, or to imagine who is responsible for harming them.78 
 
II. REFRAMING: ASKING A DIFFERENT QUESTION 
                                                 
74 ANDREA DWORKIN & CATHERINE A. MACKINNON, PORNOGRAPHY AND CIVIL 
RIGHTS: A NEW DAY FOR WOMEN’S EQUALITY 138 (1988). 
75 Id. Dworkin and MacKinnon provide the following definition for pornography: 
“‘Pornography’ means the graphic sexually explicit subordination of women through 
pictures and/or words that also includes one or more of the following: (a) women are 
presented dehumanized as sexual objects, things, or commodities; or (b) women are 
presented as sexual objects who enjoy humiliation or pain; or (c) women are 
presented as sexual objects experiencing sexual pleasure in rape, incest or other 
sexual assault; or (d) women are presented as sexual objects tied up, cut up or 
mutilated or bruised or physically hurt; or (e) women are presented in postures or 
positions of sexual submission, servility, or display; or (f) women's body parts—
including but not limited to vaginas, breasts, or buttocks—are exhibited such that 
women are reduced to those parts; or (g) women are presented being penetrated by 
objects or animals; or (h) women are presented in scenarios of degradation, 
humiliation, injury, torture, shown as filthy or inferior, bleeding, bruised, or hurt in a 
context that makes these conditions sexual.” Id. at 138–39. 
76 See Franks, supra note 28. 
77 See Cindy L. Griffin, The Essentialist Roots of the Public Sphere, 60 W.J. OF 
COMM. 21, 23 (1996) (stating that essential view “leads to totalizing of women”). 
78 Id. 
Donohue 
2018]  FEMINIST FRAMING OF NON-CONSENSUAL PORNOGRAPHY 259 
 
  
 A feminist perspective suggests the need for different 
interventions entirely for the empowerment of those targeted by Non-
Consensual Pornography.79 Imagine the following: 
You dated a man in college. By senior year, you were quite 
serious about each other and talking about making a life together. For 
you, however, the situation was complicated. Your parents did not 
approve of your having this type of relationship; moreover, the job you 
were contemplating was on the west coast and your partner had a 
strong offer from an east coast employer. You were not sure you were 
ready for a long-distance relationship at age twenty-one. You and your 
partner broke up, but the relationship ended cordially enough. You 
remained in touch as valued friends to one another, visiting each other 
often and remaining in touch over the telephone and social media. A 
year or so after graduation, your ex met someone new and began a 
dating relationship. It was your ex’s choice at that time to not share the 
full extent of your history and rather to simply introduce you as a friend. 
Like any relationship, theirs had its periods of strain and during one 
particularly difficult time, the new partner happened to stumble across 
some pictures that you and your ex had taken while intimate with one 
another over a year ago. The partner did not take the revelation your 
ex’s history with you well. They began to fight with each other and with 
you.  
Soon after the revelation you started getting odd messages from 
strangers on your Facebook page and your email. First, the people 
messaging you appeared to be trying to confirm a rendez vous, asking 
for your address or for a location where you might meet. You were not 
sure who they were or why they wanted to meet and when you said as 
much, you never heard from them again. When you asked them who they 
were or how they had your contact information you never heard back. 
Then one day, a new person messaged you and this person did not relent 
when you indicated your confusion. They called you a “tease” and 
worse. Their messages became more sexual and alluded to violence. 
You called the police but they told you that unless you knew who was 
sending you the messages, there was not much they could do for you.  
Then, someone came to your apartment in the early morning 
hours. When you called out “who’s there” the person answered, “It’s 
me, from fetfun.” You told the person you did not know anything about 
                                                 
79 Hardin & Whiteside, supra note 2, at 316, 318. 
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“fetfun” and you wanted them to go away. They left. You were shaken 
and did not sleep the whole night. In the morning, you got on Google 
and entered “fetfun.” You were directed to a website, fetfun.com. It was 
a website for people with self-declared fetishes of all descriptions. With 
some maneuvering, you made a shocking revelation: there on the 
website was a profile that contained a picture of you. The picture 
showed your body clothed, it was a picture you vaguely remember a 
college roommate taking years ago; you had given it to your ex back 
when you were dating. The narrative portion of your profile described 
your interest in violent sexual encounters and invited people to find you 
for rape fantasy encounters. The profile went on to list your address, 
your telephone number, and your employer. 
You are horrified. You are in the process of looking for a new 
job. Could a potential employer stumble across these pictures with the 
simplest of internet searches? You move immediately to contact FetFun 
to tell them that the profile isn’t your own, but will they believe you? 
You find a form through their website, but it is asking you to make 
certifications concerning copyright and the small print mentions 
something about copyright infringement. You are not even sure what 
copyright is. And what are they referring to- copy right for your picture? 
For the narrative? For the whole profile? That profile is you- your face, 
your contact information- but also, so very not you. Who has the 
copyright on that? Will they take the profile down? Even if they do, how 
many other sites are out there? As you find other sites, will they take 
posts down? How long will all this take you? Will more people show up 
at your house in the meantime?  
You decide to go to the police. You print out what you have, your 
image and the violent, sexual language blurring on the pages as they 
come off your printer. You bring them to the local police station. You 
show them the images; you give them your theory about the jealous new 
girlfriend of your old boyfriend. You see a few eyes roll from other 
officers who are blatantly listening in as you describe your situation 
first to a desk sergeant, and then again to the duty detective. The 
detective takes your sordid packet and says someone will be in touch, 
but warns you that without more, it will be hard to prove who did this. 
You wonder what he means by that remark. Who will work on getting 
the “more?” Will they investigate? You hear, precisely, nothing for 
weeks.  
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Framing theory tells us that events or issues can be moved about 
and placed into different fields of meaning.80 Power is now an 
understood element in the framing process.81 Those in power often give 
the loudest or first voice to an issue, thereby picking a frame; that frame, 
in turn, gives those people in power the ability to co-opt an issue.82 
When considering the hypothetical above, one can see how the daughter 
frame for Non-Consensual Pornography is amiss. Of course, there is the 
obvious noticing that we are not clear if the subject of the Non-
Consensual Pornography in our hypothetical is male or female.83 The 
frame is also problematic in less obvious ways. The daughter frame 
affords the subject of Non-Consensual Pornography the status of a child 
and it finds a source for compassion and concern for a subject of Non-
Consensual Pornography by arbitrarily imaging a relationship with the 
subject.  
The daughter frame decides that subjects of Non-Consensual 
Pornography are women, or rather not even women really, but girls. The 
daughter frame infantilizes the subject of Non-Consensual 
Pornography, which in turn suggests that the subject is vulnerable and 
needs parental protection or involvement. Meanwhile, subjects of Non-
Consensual Pornography are many and varied.84 They are young and 
old, well-educated and powerful; moreover, they show remarkable 
reserves of tenacity, bravery, intelligence and imagination in advocating 
for themselves.85 Not many subjects, as is the case with our hypothetical 
subject above, wish to involve their parents or other authority figures in 
their plight.86  
                                                 
80 Id. at 318. 
81 Id. at 314. See also Myra Marx Ferree, Resonance and Radicalism: Feminist 
Framing in the Abortion Debates of the United States and Germany, 109 AM. J. OF 
SOC., 304, 315 (2003). 
82 See Hardin & Whiteside, supra note 2, at 313. 
83 Males can also be vulnerable to Non-Consensual Pornography. See, e.g., Natalie 
Corner, Family of Revenge Porn Teen Who Committed Suicide Over Online 
Blackmail Beg Others Not to Suffer in Silence, MIRROR (Nov. 12, 2015), 
http://www.mirror.co.uk/tv/tv-news/family-revenge-porn-teen-who-6813481. 
84 See TAUBE ET AL., supra note 52, at 5.  
85 Id. at 5.  
86 Many of the author’s clients or consults who have been the subject of Non-
Consensual Pornography struggle with a sense of shame, believing that they are fault 
and that their naked images will embarrass their family. These worries are even more 
acute within certain cultural contexts, where the images may provoke family 
retribution. See, e.g., Patrick Cockburn, How Picture Phones Have Fuelled Honor 
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Beyond the problem of infantalization, the daughter frame 
positions the subject of Non-Consensual Pornography and the harm of 
Non-Consensual Pornography vis a vi a relationship with another. In 
this way, the idea of Non-Consensual Pornography offends or concerns 
only when we think about the subject of Non-Consensual Pornography 
as being my daughter or the daughter of another- she must be “a 
somebody” to someone else. The very insistence that the source of 
empathy or concern is positional misses the mark. Non-Consensual 
Pornography is offensive and problematic because the attack is deeply 
personal and the experience of it is isolating.87 An analogy for the 
framing dilemma of Non-Consensual Pornography might be to consider 
the traditional framing of housewifery. The dominant frame for the 
housewife was to declare that her life was “a labor of love.”88 Feminist 
framing changed the view to contemplate housewifery as “actual tiring 
labor.”89 The original frame positioned the actor, the wife, vis a vi those 
in her family who supposedly (probably) she loved.90 The second, more 
helpful, empowering frame, just looked directly at the housewife herself 
to recognize and unpack her experience independent of those around 
her.91  
When the subject of Non-Consensual Pornography is considered 
from the vantage point of a father or mother; when the subject is reduced 
to the status of a child we, not surprisingly perhaps, react with a focus 
                                                 
Killing in Iraq, INDEP. (May 16, 2008), 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/how-picture-phones-have-
fuelled-frenzy-of-honour-killing-in-iraq-829934.html. Consider our hypothetical. We 
do not know why the target does not want to involve his or her parent. Is it because 
they initially disapproved of the relationship? Is it because revelation to a parent 
might require conversations around their child having had a sexual relationship, one 
in which photos were exchanged? Why do the parents in our hypothetical not 
approve of the relationship? Is it because our subject and his/her ex were lovers? Is it 
because the relationship was a homosexual relationship? Is it because the 
relationship was a distraction from school? Do we know? Do we have to care? Is it 
not enough to understand that many subjects are highly motivated to react quickly 
and privately? Questions abound, deep, intertwining, rabbit holes of questions, many 
of which we avoid ensnaring ourselves with if we resist considering the target of the 
Sexualized Cyber-Harassment as a child. 
87 See, e.g., CITRON, supra note 35, at 133. 
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on vengeance and punishment- i.e. get the guy who did this.92 We also, 
perhaps not surprisingly, enter conversations about what our daughter, 
our child, may or may not have intended when she began a relationship 
with someone.93 When confronted with the realities of our daughter 
having had a sexual relationship, we move to sanitize or clarify the 
terms of that sexual relationship, because this feels important to us, her 
mother, her father, her keeper.94 Because otherwise we are embarrassed: 
we are embarrassed for her; we are embarrassed by her.95 Meanwhile, 
in reality, the relationships between subjects and posters of Non-
Consensual Pornography may not be as clear as the one the daughter 
frame insists.96 Consider again our hypothetical.97 Who posted the 
content? The ex or the new partner? What are the terms of the 
relationship between our subject and those two suspects? Subjects of 
Non-Consensual Pornography might not have had a relationship with 
the poster98 or they might have had a relationship but not a sexual one.99 
If they had a sexual relationship it may have been mild, brief, enduring, 
or wildly provocative.100 
To redeploy the analysis of Non-Consensual Pornography, we 
have to ask different questions. So rather than ask “what if she were my 
daughter;” let’s ask instead “what if this were me?” This new frame 
seeks to provoke a more empathic response. Empathy generally is the 
ability to understand and share the feelings of another.101 In 
psychosocial settings empathy is understood as “[perceiving] the 
internal frame of reference of another with accuracy and with the 
                                                 
92 Peck, supra note 37. 
93 Griffin, supra note 77, at 30 (“When individuals must convince others that they are 
or ought to be connected to, identified with, or protected by them, persuasion, 
dominance, mastery, and control are emphasized.”). 
94 Id.  
95 Id. 
96 See supra note 11.  
97 See hypothetical, supra Part II.  
98 See, e.g., West supra, note 64.  
99 Simon Alicea, Woman Charged with Posting Friend’s Topless Photos in 
Riverside, CHI. SUN TIMES (Mar. 17, 2016 8:13 PM), 
https://chicago.suntimes.com/news/woman-charged-with-posting-friends-topless-
photos-in-riverside/ (describing the arrest of a woman who posted sexually explicit 
photographs of a childhood friend online after the two had a falling out). 
100 Id. 
101 Claire Donohue, Client, Self, Systems: A Framework for Integrated Skills-Justice 
Education, 29 GEO. J. OF LEGAL ETHICS 439, 453–54 (2016). 
Donohue  
264  U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS [VOL. 17:2 
 
emotional components and meanings which pertain thereto as if one 
were the person, but without ever losing the as if condition.”102 The 
daughter frame accesses only sympathy, and potentially a misguided 
one at that, rather than empathy.103 The difference between sympathy 
and empathy is subtle but critical.104  
To understand the difference, between sympathy and empathy, 
consider a deep dark hole105 at the bottom of which you can see 
somebody peering out. From your vantage point you might suppose the 
person is scared. Based on this, what might you say to help them feel 
better, to assure them that help is on the way? What would you do to 
stay with them, to be with them, while you both waited? Now consider 
that you are in the hole with the person? We assumed earlier that the 
person in the deep dark hole was scared. But are they? You are close 
enough now to tell. Maybe you learn that they are embarrassed or angry 
about their predicament; maybe they are afraid and you can better 
appreciate the depths and lengths of their fear. What might you say now 
to help them feel better or assure them that help is on the way? The first 
scenario, where you are on higher ground, describes communicating 
sympathy.106 Sympathy communicates awareness and distress, which 
are not unkind or unimportant things to communicate.107 “A relationship 
based on sympathy, however, is susceptible hierarchies because a 
sympathetic reaction can leave a person feeling vulnerable or 
disempowered.”108 The latter scenario, where you joins the person and 
                                                 
102 Id. at 452. Research has identified four components or areas of empathy: first, 
emotional empathy, which involves sharing the feelings of another; then cognitive 
empathy, which speaks to the ability to comprehend the feelings of the other; third is 
moral empathy which refers to the motivation to understand and relate to the other; 
lastly, there is behavioral empathy which involves being able to communicate your 
understanding of the other. JANE STEIN-PARBUY, PATIENT AND PERSON: 
INTERPERSONAL SKILLS IN NURSING, Ch. 6 (5th ed. 2013). See also Karen E. Gerdes 
et al., Teaching Empathy: A Framework Rooted in Social Cognitive Neuroscience 
and Social Justice, 47 J. SOC. WORK EDUC. 109, 112 (2011). 
103 Donohue, supra note 101, at 453.  
104 Id. at 452–54. 
105 Samantha A. Batt-Rawden et al., Teaching Empathy to Medical Students: An 
Updated, Systemic Review, 88 ACAD. MED. 1171, 1173 (2013); see also Brené 
Brown on Empathy, YOUTUBE (Apr. 1, 2016), https://youtu.be/1Evwgu369Jw. 
106 Brené Brown on Empathy, YOUTUBE (Apr. 1, 2016), 
https://youtu.be/1Evwgu369Jw. 
107 See Gerdes et al., supra note 102, at 125 (stating “pity rarely helps, sympathy 
commonly helps, empathy always helps” (citations omitted)). 
108 Donohue, supra note 101, at 453. See also Gerdes et al., supra note 102, at 125. 
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communicate from a position beside them describes empathy.109 
Empathy allows for more effective communication, because the 
communication occurs as if the subject and the observer were on equal 
footing; the observer is reserving judgment, remaining open, and 
willing to enter and learn from the subject’s experience.110 
The exercise of viewing Non-Consensual Pornography through 
a me frame requires the reader to resist the reaction that “I would never 
do such a thing. I would never have a relationship with such a creep. I 
would never share nude photos. Never! Not me!” Again, as discussed 
previously, subjects of Non-Consensual Revenge Porn have not always 
dated the poster.111 Subjects of Non-Consensual Revenge Porn are not 
always tormented by nude photos that they took, or photos that were 
nude at all.112 The common denominator between all Non-Consensual 
Pornography cases is not any given profile or behavior of a subject of 
Non-Consensual Pornography- some stock story of a torrid love affair 
and promiscuous behavior- it is that somebody posted unconsented to 
material.113 The me frame does not, therefore, ask the observer to enter 
a state of suspended disbelief to suggest, straight facedly, that they, you, 
any one may be the subject of Non-Consensual Pornography.114   
Having reframed things to position ourselves in a more empathic 
role, as the subject of Non-Consensual Pornography ourselves, we 
                                                 
109 Donohue, supra note 101, at 452.  
110 Id.at 452–53 (citing Denise Panosky & Desiree Diaz, Teaching Caring and 
Empathy Through Simulation, 13 INT’L J. FOR HUMAN CARING 44–46 (2009)) 
(describing simulation in which student nurses were obliged to “walk a mile in 
another’s shoes” during a simulated exercise. The students were required to wear 
adult diapers and colostomy bags (with mock content) for forty-eight hours). 
111 Corner, supra note 83; CITRON, supra note 35, at 50–51.  
112 Consider our hypothetical where the initial content is a clothed photo 
accompanied by sexual commentary imagined, we begin to believe, by a third party, 
not an ex. Compare Playboy Model Sentenced for ‘Body-Shaming’ in LA Locker 
Room, BBC NEWS (May 24, 2107), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-
40038332 (involving a case in which a woman took a nude “body shaming” picture 
of a woman in a locker room), with a particular client of the author who suffered 
terrible indignities after sharing photos confidence and intimacy during the course of 
a many-year long relationship that started, banally enough with two college 
sweethearts.   
113 See CITRON, supra note 35, at 45–50; Vanity Fair, Cover Exclusive: Jennifer 
Lawrence Calls Photo Hacking a “Sex Crime,” VANITY FAIR (Oct. 7, 2014 8:58 
AM), https://www.vanityfair.com/hollywood/2014/10/jennifer-lawrence-cover. 
114 See CITRON, supra note 35, at 45–50; Vanity Fair, supra note 113. 
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wonder about the experience of waiting for the law enforcement 
response, we wonder about what happened next.115  
You receive a few more personal electronic messages from 
people, though thankfully no one else shows up at your door. You can’t 
sleep. At night, rather than sleep you use the profile name and other 
descriptors from the site and you start your own policing to make sure 
nothing else is out there, and to try and figure out who did this. You 
found pictures of yourself on forged Facebook and LinkedIn pages. The 
pictures here again depict you clothed, but the content of the pages had 
been manipulated away from their intended purpose of social and 
professional networking to pages that made ostensibly self-reported 
declarations of your being a “slut,” and worse. You find collages of 
images in chatrooms and image boards, the most troubling of which 
was 4chan, an image board where users sign on without profiles and 
post images anonymously. Many pictures on the collage are the nude 
pictures you had and your ex’s new partner found. Other pictures are 
pictures from college; a few are selfies you took yourself. These 
innocuous photos have been photo-shopped to render you pants-less or 
to depict penises, breasts, and backsides near your face. You finally 
hear back from FetFun. They remove the profile and also offer a 
customer service number of sorts. You call and the person on the phone 
tells you “more than she has to” (she is quick to say), and gives you the 
IP address for the person who created the profile.  
You take the information to the police. They are enthusiastic for 
the material and thank you for it, indicating that they had not been able 
to find much. You are annoyed that you, with no training in investigation 
and with the same material they had, had been able to find the IP 
address, but you are optimistic that your new information might move 
things forward. You ask them if they will trace the IP address. You tell 
them you want them to find out who it is and just scare them into 
stopping. They tell you they will look into it, but once they trace the IP 
address to a person, they will want to hand the case over to the States 
Attorney, because the States Attorney’s office will want to be involved 
in decisions about making contact with suspects or executing search 
warrants. You share a dawning theory that this may be your ex or your 
                                                 
115 In a way, the daughter frame accesses only sympathy, and potentially a misguided 
one at that, rather than empathy. The difference between sympathy and empathy is 
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ex’s new girlfriend. They express some concern about the logistics of 
contacting those parties because they are out of state, which might mean 
involving the other state’s law enforcement. Lastly, they tell you that it 
might be contrary to investigation priorities to alert the possible poster 
prior to their being ready to execute a search warrant, because the 
poster could delete incriminating material or otherwise destroy 
evidence. You ask them how long the various conversations and 
participation of the States Attorney or other law enforcement may take. 
They tell you that “it’s hard to tell.”  
You ask them what you can do in the meantime, since whoever 
it is may still be posting. They tell you are sorry, but that you may just 
have to get used to a new normal. They suggest that you check the 
internet daily looking for your name or using reverse image search, 
change your cell number, change your landline number, and make sure 
it is unlisted; change your email address, change all passwords on 
internet based sites, and delete your social media presence; be 
conservative about what transactions you complete online, especially 
where they require you to enter an address; ask your employer not to 
list your name or picture online with your company; change your locks, 
call the police if there are any other knocks at your door, and also 
consider moving.   
Now it strikes us that a person in this situation very well may 
want the perpetrator punished; but in the meantime (the incredibly long, 
tedious, and yet terrifying meantime) they would want to exercise some 
control of the available content. Simply put, they would want the 
content taken down. Desiring and then pursuing removal also 
crystalizes the realization that those in control of the content might not 
necessarily be the original poster.116  
A me frame, informed by a feminist perspective pushes back on the 
co-opting of sexuality and self-determination.117 The perspective 
situates the problem of Non-Consensual Pornography and Sexualized 
Cyber Harassment as being a matter of marketable sexual dominance 
and aggression.118 Therefore, existing critiques of criminal Non-
Consensual Pornography law gain traction. But also, the absence of 
                                                 
116 See CITRON, supra note 35, at 142–43 (“Perpetrators can be hard to identify if 
they use anonymizing technologies or post on sites that do not collect IP addresses. 
Because the law’s efficacy depends on having defendants to penalize, legal reform 
should include, but not focus exclusively on, harassers.”). 
117 See Hardin & Whiteside, supra note 2, at 314; CITRON, supra note 35, at 81–82. 
118 Franks, supra note 28.  
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debate about legal reform for civil accountability and easy removal of 
material becomes more obvious and unacceptable. 
 
III. CURRENT RESPONSE TO NON-CONSENSUAL PORNOGRAPHY 
 
At the start, no laws existed on the books explicitly outlawing 
Non-Consensual Pornography or defining its furtherance as tortious 
conduct. Redress required, therefore, a cobbling together of off-point 
legal remedies. Eventually, however, different jurisdictions began to 
criminalize Non-Consensual Pornography in its most basic form at 
least; which is the say that criminalization focused on the poster.119 
Similarly civil liability as against the poster also seems possible, though 
limited.120 In attempting to reclaim for herself,121 therefore, any loss of 
privacy, safety, reputation, and control, a subject of Non-Consensual 
Pornography ostensibly has four avenues of redress: 1) holding the 
poster criminally liable;122 2) holding the host of the content criminally 
liable;123 3) holding the poster civilly liable;124 and/or 4) holding the 
host civilly liable.125 As shall be discussed in more detail in sections 
below, this last possibility remains elusive, beyond the Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act’s feeble intervention requiring internet 
service providers to remove content from their website, if they wish to 
avoid liability for copyright infringement.126 This is because the 
Communications Decency Act virtually assures that internet service 
providers can escape all other liability by providing safe harbor to 
                                                 
119 See, e.g., Invasion of Privacy, Degree of Crime; defenses, privileges, N.J. REV 
STAT. § 2C:14-9 (2004). 
120 See Brooke Jarvis, How One Woman’s Digital Life was Weaponized Against Her, 
WIRED (Nov. 14, 2017, 6:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/how-one-womans-
digital-life-was-weaponized-against-her/ (discussing that a civil case was brought 
because of the difficulty of bringing a criminal case in a harassment/stalking 
context). 
121 In a survey conducted by the Cyber Civil Rights Initiative in 2014, 90% of those 
who identified as Revenge Porn victims were women. See CYBER CIVIL RIGHTS 
INITIATIVE, REVENGE PORN STATISTICS (Dec. 2014), 
https://oag.ca.gov/cyberexploitation. 
122 Infra Section III.A-B 
123 Infra Section III.A-B 
124 See infra Part IV. 
125 See infra Part IV. 
126 See infra Section IV.A. 
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Internet Service Providers.127 Shields against liability, and the 
availability of only weak legal interventions in limited cases, removes 
incentives for hosts to engage with the problem of Non-Consensual 
Pornography.128 The most problematic extension of the lack of 
incentives is the insufficiency of protocols, procedures, or even 
opportunities for subjects of Non-Consensual Pornography to insist on 
take-down measures even in the situations where a subject of revenge 
porn can claim copyright in the image.129 The overwhelming barriers 
that prevent removal of content is inapposite to the stated desires of 
subjects of Non-Consensual Pornography, who again and again voice 
the desire to take control of the situation and mitigate further damage 
by having content removed.130 However, before we can critique the 
current state of affairs, it is necessary to start with an overview of what 
that state of affairs is. 
 
A. Criminal Law Response 
  
 The daughter frame inspires reactions and assumptions. 
Meanwhile, when laws percolate up out of assumptions and interests 
ancillary to the precise experience of victimization, they are by design 
limited.131 This paper suggests that one limitation has been in over 
                                                 
127 But see Doe v. Internet Brands, Inc., 824 F.3d 846, 852 (9th Cir. 2016). 
128 See WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF 
TORT LAW 6 (1987). In fact, the safe harbors represented a major turnaround from 
the initial recommendations of the White House’s Working Group on Intellectual 
Property (Working Group), which had concluded that such sweeping immunity for 
OSPs would be a bad thing: “It would be unfair—and set a dangerous precedent—to 
allow one class of distributors to self-determine their liability by refusing to take 
responsibility. This would encourage intentional and willful ignorance.” Bruce 
Lehman & Ronald Brown, INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE TASK FORCE, 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE NATIONAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE: THE 
REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS (Sept. 
1995), https://www.eff.org/files/filenode/DMCA/ntia_dmca_white_paper.pdf. 
129 See CITRON, supra note 35, at 172. Some hosts offer costly content removal 
services, many costing several hundreds of dollars. Id. at 175; see also infra notes 
133–36 and accompanying text. 
130 The website Undox.Me provides resources for individuals who have been subject 
to Non-Consensual Pornography and doxing, including guides on how to remove 
pictures from different websites and stop doxing in progress. See, e.g., Take Down 
Your Pics Take Back Your Life: A DIY Guide to Removing Images Posted Without 
Your Consent, UNDOX.ME, http://www.undox.me/ (last accessed on Dec. 28, 2017). 
131 Griffin, supra note 77, at 8. 
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emphasizing the criminal response to Non Consensual Pornography: 
punishing the poster will stop him and then the problem (for my 
daughter) will be over and the poster will be exposed as the bad person 
(who stands in marked contrast to my good girl daughter). This paper 
hopes to be an intervention in the underdevelopment of law and 
scholarship by raising new questions and critiques, specifically in 
regard to civil remedies. That said, certain trends and critiques in the 
criminal response to Non-Consensual Pornography are relevant to the 
broader conversation on the subject so to that end, they will be outlined 
here.  
As of December 2017, thirty-eight states have laws that 
expressly outlaw Non-Consensual Pornography; whereas before 2013, 
only three states criminalized this behavior.132 There was even a bill 
introduced to define Non-Consensual Pornography as a federal 
crime.133 The various laws have common features; as an example of a 
fairly typical statute, the District of Columbia’s Criminalization of Non-
Consensual Pornography Act states:  
 
It shall be unlawful in the District of Columbia for a person to 
knowingly publish one or more sexual images of another 
identified or identifiable person when:  
(1) The person depicted did not consent to the 
disclosure or publication of the sexual image;  
(2) There was an agreement or understanding 
between the person depicted and the person 
publishing that that the sexual image would not 
be disclosed or published; and 
(3) The person published the sexual image with the 
intent to harm the person depicted or to receive 
financial gain.  
A person who violates this subsection shall be guilty of a 
misdemeanor. . . 134  
 
                                                 
132 State Revenge Porn Laws, C.A. GOLDBERG LAW, 
http://www.cagoldberglaw.com/states-with-revenge-porn-laws/ (last visited Dec. 26, 
2017). Additionally, as of the last update, eight states had pending legislation. Id. 
133 See Rep. Jackie Speier, Intimate Privacy Protection Act of 2015 Discussion Draft, 
SANTA CLARA LAW DIGITAL COMMONS (2015), 
http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/historical/1003/. As of publication, this bill has 
not passed.  
134 D.C. CODE § 22-3051 (4). (Defining first-degree unlawful publication). 
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The language regarding consent of the person depicted and the 
exposure of nudity or sexual acts are common features of most statutes 
including that of one of the first Non-Consensual Pornography statutes, 
the New Jersey statute: 
 
An actor commits a crime of the third degree if, knowing that he 
is not licensed or privileged to do so, he discloses any 
photograph, film, videotape, recording or any other 
reproduction of the image of another person whose intimate 
parts are exposed or who is engaged in an act of sexual 
penetration or sexual contact, unless that person has consented 
to such disclosure.135  
 
Absent a tidy fit under Non-Consensual Pornography laws, a 
state may prosecute a poster for criminal harassment, voyeurism, or 
even threats to commit a crime.136 And indeed, in the District of 
Columbia there is at least some evidence that the United States 
Attorney’s Office struggles to proceed with many crimes under the 
District’s Non-Consensual Pornography law, D.C. Code 544-30.51.137 
Since its inception in December 2014, only a handful of crimes have 
been formally charged.138 Other jurisdictions have found that drafting 
                                                 
135 Invasion of Privacy, Degree of Crime; defenses, privileges, N.J. REV STAT. § 
2C:14-9(c) (2004) (emphasis added).  
136 See infra Part III; see also TOMMY WELLS, REPORT ON BILL 20-903, THE 
“CRIMINALIZATION OF NON-CONSENSUAL PORNOGRAPHY ACT OF 2014,” at 3 (2014) 
(existing legal remedies frequently are in adequate to protect victims of Non-
Consensual Pornography or to deter perpetrators). 
137 In fact, it was not until April 2017 that someone was convicted under the law and 
here, notably, the defendant’s campaign of harassment was not one of sophisticated 
cyberattacks, rather he papered her home and workplace with physical prints. Keith 
L. Alexander, D.C. Man Becomes First to be Convicted Under District’s New 
Revenge Porn Law, WASH. POST (Apr. 19, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/public-safety/dc-man-becomes-first-to-be-
convicted-under-districts-new-revenge-porn-law/2017/04/19/2e6ab4ca-2516-11e7-
b503-9d616bd5a305_story.html?utm_term=.b4ded5505; see Email from Janese 
Bechtol, Chief, Domestic Violence Section, Office of the Attorney General for the 
District of Columbia, to author (Aug. 4, 2016 6:55PM) (on file with author); Email 
from Jodi S. Lazarus, Deputy Chief, Sex Offense & Domestic Violence Section, 
United States Attorney’s Office, to author (Aug 23, 2017 1:57 PM) (on file with 
author). 
138 See also The Fight Against Cyber Exploitation, CAL. DEPT. OF JUST., 
https://www.oag.ca.gov/cyberexploitation/timeline (last visited Dec. 28, 2017) 
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appropriate code is just part of the challenge; further amendments and 
legislation are needed to give law enforcement an effective arsenal to 
locate and forfeit offensive content.139 
 
B. Critiques of the Criminal Response 
 
There are several popular critiques to criminal Non-Consensual 
Pornography statutes including: critique of what action constitutes 
publication or distribution of Non-Consensual Pornography; whether 
the statutes should include intent to harm provisions; choices around 
what content to criminalize; and the corollary First Amendment 
challenges.140 There are varying definitions of distribution in Non-
Consensual Pornography criminal codes. New Jersey’s law, as an 
                                                 
(explaining that far too often, police officers fail to address cyber harassment 
complaints because they lack familiarity with the law and the technology). In 
response to the graphic threats made to the journalist Amanda Hess, officers asked 
her, “What’s Twitter?” CITRON, supra note 35, at 84.  
139 For example, in 2013, when California first passed Senate Bill 255, criminalizing 
Non-Consensual Pornography, the bill did not cover “selfies,” which includes more 
than half of Non-Consensual Pornography cases. Cannella Legislation to Strengthen 
Revenge Porn Law Passed by Legislature, OFFICE OF SEN. ANTHONY CANNELLA 
(Aug. 25, 2014), http://cannella.cssrc.us/content/cannella-legislation-strengthen-
revenge-porn-law-passed-legislature. A year later, the California Legislature passed 
Senate Bill 1255, the “Revenge Porn 2.0 Act” to “expand the law to protect a greater 
number of victims” by including “selfies.” Id. See also Hunter Schwarz, California’s 
Revenge Porn Law, Which Notoriously Didn’t Include Selfies, Now Will, WASH. 




140 See Antigone Books, LLC v. Brnovich, No. 2:14-cv-02100-PHX-SRB, 2015 BL 
225562 at *1 (D. Ariz., July 10, 2015) (enjoining enforcement of Arizona Revised 
Statute § 13-1425). The statute, in part, declared that “[i]t is unlawful to intentionally 
disclose, display, distribute, publish, advertise or offer a photograph, videotape, film 
or digital recording of another person in a state of nudity or engaged in specific 
sexual activities if the person knows or should have known that the depicted person 
has not consented to the disclosure.” H.B. 2515, 51st Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 
2014), ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-1425(A). The plaintiffs in the Brnovich case, which 
included the ACLU argued that the statute impeded First Amendment rights. Lee 
Rowland, VICTORY! Federal Judge Deep-Sixes Arizona’s Ridiculously Overbroad 
‘Nude Photo’ Law, ACLU (July 10, 2015 6:45 PM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/free-
speech/internet-speech/victory-federal-judge-deep-sixes-arizonas-ridiculously-
overbroad. See also Franks, supra note 28; CITRON, supra note 35, at 124–25. 
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exemplar of those like it,141 outlaws disclosure without consent and 
proceeds to define disclosure broadly: “for purposes of this subsection, 
"disclose" means sell, manufacture, give, provide, lend, trade, mail, 
deliver, transfer, publish, distribute, circulate, disseminate, present, 
exhibit, advertise or offer. . .”142 D.C. punishes “publication” and 
restricts that definition to “transfer or exhibit to 6 or more persons, or to 
make available for viewing by uploading on the Internet.”143 Other 
states offer still narrower protection in restricting the application of the 
criminal code only to instances where the images are put on the 
internet.144  
A feminist perspective would, of course, disagree: a publication 
of your image without consent is a “taking,” an act of ownership over 
your body and choices; degree is irrelevant. Similar critique of degree 
is often employed by those critical of the stock response to rape: “[t]he 
duration of [the survivor’s] enslavement could have lasted for twenty 
minutes or for twenty days, but its exploitative purpose and form remain 
regardless of duration.”145  
New Jersey’s statute146 also offers a nice example of broad 
protection for victims of Non-Consensual Pornography in that the 
                                                 
141 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:14-9 (c). 
142 Id.  
143 D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-3051(5). 
144 MD. CODE. ANN., CRIM LAW. § 3-809 (West 2017). Yet we seem to understand 
that “a woman’s consent to sleep with one man [cannot] be taken as consent to sleep 
with his friends,” so by extension a woman’s consent to sleep with a man or have her 
nude photograph taken by a man was not a license to have him share her body with 
his friends. CITRON, supra note 35, at 147. The impropriety of thinking otherwise is 
not enhanced by degree. Whether a man endeavors to share a woman’s body with 
one man or six men without her consent seems irrelevant to an understanding 
whether his actions violated the woman. 
145 Jane Kim, Taking Rape Seriously: Rape as Slavery, 35 HARV. J. L. & GENDER 
263, 295 (2012). 
146 In relevant part, the statute states “[a]n actor commits a crime of the third degree 
if, knowing that he is not licensed or privileged to do so, he discloses any 
photograph, film, videotape, recording or any other reproduction of the image of 
another person whose intimate parts are exposed or who is engaged in an act of 
sexual penetration or sexual contact, unless that person has consented to such 
disclosure. For purposes of this subsection, ‘disclose’ means sell, manufacture, give, 
provide, lend, trade, mail, deliver, transfer, publish, distribute, circulate, disseminate, 
present, exhibit, advertise or offer.” N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:14-9 (c) (2004). 
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statute does not contain an “intent to harm” provision.147 Many statutes 
include an intent to harm requirement;148 those that do not face steep 
challenges.149 The intent to harm provision troubles scholars and 
practitioners alike.150 To begin, it invites a discussion of the perpetrators 
motives which distracts from the harm that befalls subjects regardless 
of those motivations.151 Are we looking to ensure that the subject has 
been victimized in some accessible way? Does it feel important to 
ensure that we can show that she has been hounded and hunted before 
we can justify recognizing and protecting her dignity? Barring breach 
of some code of relationship decorum, is the invasion of Non-
Consensual Pornography not apparent or meaningful enough to us?152 
“The knowing violation of privacy is the substance of the harm.”153 
Intent to harm provisions invite “a showing of “bad purpose” 
analysis.154 Yet “[n]onconsensual pornography is not always about 
revenge, but it is always about privacy” and that violation of privacy 
occurs regardless of the posters motivations.155 Privacy actions must be 
nimble enough to extend subjects of Non-Consensual Pornography the 
dignity of having a “multiplicitous” selves or at the very least allow that 
                                                 
147 See id. Compare N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:14-9 (2004) (containing no “intent to 
harm” provision), with LA. STAT. ANN. § 14:283.2 (2015) (including an “intent to 
harm” provision), and H.B. 2107, Act 115, GEN. ASSEM. (Pa. 2014) (including an 
“intent to harm” provision). 
148 D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-3052(a)(3) (2015). But see D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-
3054(a)(2) (2015) (involving conscious disregard). 
149 ACLU of Ariz. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Child Safety, 377 P.3d 339, 348 (Ariz. Ct. App. 
2016). 
150 Compare Franks, supra note 28, with ACLU of Ariz., 377 P.3d at 349–50. 
151 Franks, supra note 28. 
152 Branches of feminism have evolved in thinking about sexual violence and have 
moved away from a preoccupation with woman as victim, realizing that such a focus 
does not “adequately account for a women’s ability to resist, make choices, and 
contribute to the cultural meaning of gender in society.” MARTHA CHAMALLAS, 
INTRODUCTION TO FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY 25 (2nd ed. 2003). 
153 Franks, supra note 28 (stating further that “[i]t is for good reason that privacy 
laws, from trespass laws to confidentiality requirements to prohibitions against 
voyeurism, do not require that perpetrators be motivated by intent to harm or harass 
the victim”). 
154 It is beyond the scope of this article to engage in the close analysis of each 
varying Non-Consensual Pornography statute to determine whether and which 
elements of each statute are indeed specific and general intent provisions. What sets 
general intent apart from specific intent is that “general intent may be inferred from 
the doing of the act.” United States v. Kleinbart, 27 F.3d 586, 592 (D.D.C. 1994).  
155 Franks, supra note 28.  
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different subjects of Non-Consensual Pornography will have different 
entry points into their experience of Non-Consensual Pornography.156 
By extension, this means those subjected to Non-Consensual 
Pornography will have different experiences of, and reactions to 
victimization.157 Historically, violations of privacy alone have been 
sufficient basis to criminalize behavior.158 As early as 1890, Samuel 
Warren and Louis Brandeis noted that it would be “[d]oubtless 
desirable” that an individual’s privacy should “receive the added 
protection of the criminal law.”159 
Aside from the critiques concerning intent and distribution 
provisions, there is a more general critique of all criminal statues for 
Non-Consensual Pornography, namely the requirement that the victim 
be nude in the photograph or video. As the hypo above demonstrates, 
there is a world of highly sexualized harassment that does not contain 
naked depictions.160 A response might be that harassment or stalking 
laws would otherwise penalize the conduct, but those laws often have 
elements that are impediments to their use in the context of Sexualized 
Cyber Harassment. In New York, for example, harassment would 
require that the perpetrator sent the post to the victim; meanwhile, many 
perpetrators do not communicate directly with the victim, but rather 
post to online communities of strangers or send links and posts to the 
                                                 
156 Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. 
REV. 581, 595 (1990). 
157 Id. at 601. It may well be that some subjects of Non-Consensual Pornography 
perceive, and by extension may be able to assist with making a case, that a poster is 
taking his revenge on them in some way. These subjects, however, may not wish to 
revisit the trajectory of their relationship and their sexual decisions in a public way. 
Yet they, unlike their celebrity counterpart, will have to. Still other subjects may be 
dumbstruck by the behavior as it flows from a relationship that they hitherto for 
experienced as functional and safe. Still others may not know the perpetrator well or 
may have had a platonic relationship with him such that the post seems out of step 
with anything they or anyone would have expected. These latter subjects of Non-
Consensual Pornography are not well situated to understand or litigate their 
defendant’s intent. One might hope that the defendants’ actions will speak for 
themselves, but will they speak loudly enough? 
158 Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 
193, 195–96 (1890). 
159 Id. at 219. See also CITRON, supra note 35, at 146. In 1974 Congress criminalized 
disclosure of records that contain personally identifying information to anyone not 
authorized to receive it. Id. 
160 See TAUBE ET AL., supra note 52, at 5 (finding that abusive written statements 
are the most common method of harassment). 
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friends and acquaintances of the victim.161 And stalking includes intent 
provisions or course of conduct provisions162 that set a high bar for 
prosecution, all the while failing to reach the “threats, defamation, and 
privacy invasions. . . even though they were at the heart of the abuse.”163 
However, if we affirm that the harm suffered is a loss of privacy, 
dignity, or in other words, the right to control one’s own sexual identity, 
we begin to see that the un-consented to descriptions of the victim’s 
alleged sexual conduct and of her body are as harmful as images 
themselves.164 Yet, the insistence that there be nudity may well track 
with the ways in which courts have historically dealt with 
pornography.165 The court has tackled the “intractable obscenity 
problem” in the context of prohibiting dissemination or exhibition of 
obscene material when the mode of dissemination carries with it a 
significant danger of offending the sensibilities of unwilling recipients 
or of exposure to juveniles.”166 The court then tasks itself with splicing 
“unorthodox ideas, controversial ideas, even [hateful] ideas” that 
nonetheless can be expressed lawfully, from those expressions that are 
obscene and “utterly without redeeming social importance.”167 The 
Court has struggled to determine what constitutes “obscene, 
pornographic material subject to regulation under the States' police 
power” and has declared that any state statute must be “carefully 
limited.”168 Perhaps pictures of genitals and sexual acts more readily tip 
                                                 
161 CITRON, supra note 35, at 143 (citing People v. Barber, No. 2013NY059761, 
2014 WL 641316 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb. 18, 2014); Erin Donaghue, Judge Throws Out 
New York Non-Consensual Pornography Case, CBS (Feb. 25, 2014), http:// 
www.cbsnews.com/ news/ judge-throws-out-new-york-revenge-porn-case.  
162 D.C. CODE § 22-3133(a) (2009); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.26.  
163 CITRON, supra note 35, at 143. Harassment and stalking laws should be updated 
to “reach the totality of the abuse.” Id. at 142; D.C. CODE § 22-3133 (2009). 
164 See CITRON, supra note 35, at 74 (explaining how commenters trivialize cyber 
harassment by insisting that unlike “real rape,” words and images on a screen cannot 
really hurt someone). 
165 See Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 191 (1964) (finding that possessing and 
exhibiting an obscene film was protected by the First Amendment); Miller v. 
California, 413 U.S. 15, 18-19 (1973) (holding that a state offense must be limited to 
works which, “taken as a whole, appeal to the prurient interest in sex, which portray 
sexual conduct in a patently offensive way, and which … do not have serious 
literary, artistic, political, or scientific value”). 
166 Miller, 413 U.S. at 18–19. 
167 Id. at 20. 
168 Id. at 20, 23–24. 
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the scales in favor of state action.169 The concern about justifying state 
action is particularly pronounced for proponents of Non-Consensual 
Pornography bills, where the countervailing voices loudly decrying 
Non-Consensual Pornography laws a danger to the principles of free 
speech.170 While the court’s standard for obscenity does allow for work 
that “depicts or describes”171 sexual conduct, arguably a written 
description is not as patently graphic and is less likely than a visual 
image to so immediately engage or offend un-consenting adult and 
juvenile audiences.172 As this brief discussion of the criminal responses 
to Non-Consensual Pornography and Sexualized Cyber Harassment 
suggest, there is much work to be done to improve the conceptualization 
of Non-Consensual Pornography and Sexualized Cyber Harassment, 
and reaction to Non-Consensual Pornography and Sexualized Cyber 
Harassment.173  Nonetheless, the criminal responses seem decided 
                                                 
169 Jacobellis, 378 U.S. at 197 (Stewart, J., concurring) (stating the infamous test for 
obscenity: “I know it when I see it”). 
170 See Rowland, supra note 140; see also CITRON, supra note 35, at 190 (explaining 
how in the eyes of commentators, people should be allowed to say anything they 
want online and that if the law intervened, the internet “would cease to foster 
expression.”). 
171 Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (emphasis added). And indeed, most 
definitions of pornography indicate that pornography is about showing or describing 
“sexual organs or activity.” See Pornography, GOOGLE, 
https://www.google.com/search?q=definition+of+pornography&oq=definition+of+p
ornography&aqs=chrome..69i57.6615j0j8&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8 (last 
visited Sept. 23, 2014); see also Pornography, MIRIAM WEBSTER, 
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/pornography (last visited Sept. 23, 
2017) (defining “pornography” as the depiction of erotic behavior). 
172 It may be that lawmakers’ concern about perpetrators’ intent, along with their 
insistence on the use of images, have a common denominator: they speak to an 
abiding concern that Non-Consensual Pornography laws might infringe on First 
Amendment rights of perpetrators. The argument would go that criminalizing 
descriptions of a victim’s body, sexual acts, or her sexual proclivities is, on some 
level, criminalizing a perpetrators commentary or observations. To some this may 
feel like impermissible criminalization of speech. Stated intent for obscenity laws 
protect the innocent. But see CATHERINE MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST 
THEORY OF THE STATE 230–31 (1989) (arguing that the intent requirement defines 
the injury from the standpoint of the perpetrator. “If he did not mean harm, no harm 
was done”). 
173 See Franks, supra note 28 (advocating, as one of the initial voices, against Non-
Consensual Pornography and Sexualized Cyber-Harassment and for the re-
conceptualizing of early criminal responses). 
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compared to the faltering, severely lacking civil responses that will be 
taken up in more detail below. 
 
IV. FEMINIST JURISPRUDENCE AND CIVIL REMEDIES TO NON-
CONSENSUAL PORNOGRAPHY 
 
Feminist framing invites a consideration of civil legal redress as 
a means to control Non-Consensual Pornography and sexually 
harassing content, because feminist jurisprudence invites consideration 
of how we might empower those subjected to the harm of Non-
Consensual Pornography.174 We will see, however, that the remedies 
are not easily or obviously available to the subjects of Non-Consensual 
Pornography.175 On some level it is not surprising that the subjects of 
Non-Consensual Pornography, typically women and girls, struggle for 
traction with this issue, because it has long been a battle to get attention 
for issues that plague women and girls.176 The difficulty is heightened 
if lawmakers and the public are distracted by the notion that at some 
point in time the victim might have consented to certain actions, 
particularly sexual actions.177  
There are several possible civil responses or remedies for claims 
involving photography and video content, but they are not often 
deployed against perpetrators of Non-Consensual Pornography.178 
When they are, they prove to have frustrating limitations when mapped 
                                                 
174 See Hardin & Whiteside, supra note 2, at 316, 318 (defining feminist 
perspective generally); MACKINNON, supra note 172, at 128–29 (taking issue 
with how male dominant societies and institutions “construct what sexuality 
means” in ways that very likely subordinate women’s experiences and 
expressions”).  
175 See WELLS, supra note 32, at 3–5; Franks, supra note 28. 
176 CITRON, supra note 35, at 146; MACKINNON, supra note 172, at 163 (explaining 
that governments only “right … what government has previously wronged,” so if the 
lives and experiences of women and girls have been ignored, the government 
assumes that everyone is free and equal, even while such an assumption flies in the 
face of lived realities of subordination). 
177 See, e.g., Patricia Mahoney & Linda M. Williams, Sexual Assault in Marriage: 
Prevalence, Consequences, and Treatment of Wife Rape, NAT’L CENTER ON 
DOMESTIC AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE, 
http://www.ncdsv.org/images/nnfr_partnerviolence_a20-
yearliteraturereviewandsynthesis.pdf (last visited Dec. 28, 2017) (explaining the 
“marital rape exemption,” which was the presumed common law in the United States 
until the late 1970s). 
178 WELLS, supra note 32, at 3–5. 
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to the particular conduct and claims inherent in Non-Consensual 
Pornography.179 Moreover, currently, Internet Service Providers (ISP) 
appear to be beyond the reach of even limited claims due to the law’s 
safe harbor provisions for third parties.180 But first, rather than 
beginning with the particular application to Non-Consensual 
Pornography, let us consider the civil law responses to the use of a 
photograph or video depicting one’s image.  
One’s options for legal redress exist on a spectrum of responses 
depending on the circumstances. With the simplest case when someone 
reproduces a photograph in which I myself already have a registered 
copyright in or could readily establish that I have copyright, I could tell 
the person using the image to cease and desist.181 If they refused, I could 
bring a case for copyright infringement.182 Adding a layer of 
complexity, let us further assume that the person using my image, 
whether they owned the copyright or not, did so with some malfeasance. 
Here, in addition to, or instead of, my copyright claim, I may have some 
other claim in tort, intentional infliction of emotional distress or libel 
perhaps.183 Let us further assume that the reproduction or distribution 
of the image amounted to an invasion on my personal affairs. Such a 
situation may give rise to a claim of invasion of privacy.184 Now let us 
change my own personal circumstances. Let us suppose I am a person 
of some public celebrity or that I have a market in my own image. Here, 
                                                 
179 Id. 
180 47 U.S.C. § 230(1) (2012) (“No provider or user of an interactive computer 
service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by 
another information content provider.”). 
181 See 17 U.S.C. § 502 (2012). There are several “how-to guides” and samples for 
cease and desist letters online, including by professional organizations. See, e.g., 
Cease and Desist Sample, NAT’L PRESS PHOTOGRAPHERS ASSOC. 
https://nppa.org/sites/default/files/cease_and_desist_sample.pdf (last visited Dec. 
28, 2017). 
182 17 U.S.C. § 501(a)–(b) (2012) (outlining who is liable for remedies of 
copyright violations). 
183 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYS. & EMOT. HARM § 46 (AM. LAW INST. 
2012); DAVID A. ELDER, DEFAMATION: A LAWYER’S GUIDE § 1:9. 
184 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS: INTRUSION UPON SECLUSION § 652B 
(AM. LAW INST. 1977). 
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I may have additional intellectual property claims in the form of 
violation of the right of publicity.185 
In all of these hypotheticals, I have yet to suggest a precise 
means of reproduction or distribution, so we default to contemplating a 
situation where someone has run off posters with my face on them and 
posted them around my town. Yet, of course, this is not the most 
probable method employed in today’s day and age.186 So as a final point 
of consideration, let us assume that the person reproducing or 
distributing my image does so through use of the world wide web. Here, 
an ISP, hosts the content placed there by our potential defendant. We 
might wonder, what, if any liability does the ISP have for the content 
on their page. The discussion below will clarify a troubling answer for 
subjects of Non-Consensual Pornography, namely: ISPs are practically 
judgment proof.187 The only situation in which a party may hope to 
interact with an ISP with some modicum of success is in the limited 
instance when the subject of the offensive content can assert a copyright 
interest in the content.188  
 
A. Take-Downs: The Digital Millennium Copyright Act, & 
Copyright 
 
Regardless of whether a subject of Non-Consensual 
Pornography contacts law enforcement and regardless of whether that 
contact provokes a criminal justice response, a subject of Non-
Consensual Pornography may consult with online resources, blogs, and 
legal services.189 These sources will likely direct her toward resources 
                                                 
185 Allison v. Vintage Sports Plaques, 136 F.3d 1443, 1447 (11th Cir. 1998) (citing J. 
THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 
28:6 (1997). 
186 Laura Sydell, Unlikely Allies Join Fight to Protect Free Speech on the Internet, 
WAMU (Aug. 23, 2017), http://wamu.org/story/17/08/23/unlikely-allies-join-fight-to-
protect-free-speech-on-the-internet/ (stating” [r]ight now, Google has more than 80 
percent of the online search market, according to Net Market Share. Google and 
Facebook combined have 77 percent of the online ad market, and 79 percent of 
Americans on the Internet have a Facebook account, according to Pew Research”). 
187 But see Doe No. 14 v. Internet Brands, Inc., 824 F.3d 846 (9th Cir. 2016) (finding 
that the CDA was not intended to be a shelter). 
188 Digital Millennium Copyright Act § 202, 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2012). 
189 See, e.g., Undox Me, supra note 130; WITHOUT MY CONSENT, 
http://withoutmyconsent.org/ (last visited Dec. 27, 2017) (providing victims of online 
privacy violations with a place to discuss and learn information about resources); 
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for take down.190 The Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998 
(DMCA) provides the most obvious or immediate hook for take-
downs.191 Section 512(c) of the DMCA limits the liability of ISPs for 
any material hosted on their website that might infringe the copyright 
of another.192 In order to be eligible for the protection from copyright 
infringement claims, the ISP must: 
 
1. Not have the requisite level of knowledge of the infringing 
activity;193  
2. Receive no benefit from the infringing activity, if they have 
the right and ability to control the infringing activity; 
3. Designate an agent to receive notifications of claimed 
infringement and file the designation with the Copyright 
Office; 
4. Expeditiously take down or block access to the material, 
upon receiving proper notification of claimed 
infringement.194  
 
The provisions of the DMCA that provide “take-down” 
mechanisms for subjects of Non-Consensual Pornography, are 
restricted to scenarios where the complaining party can claim copyright 
to the content that offends or upsets them.195 Even here there are no 
requirements and clear guidelines about what constitutes expeditious 
take downs.196 Moreover, as shall be discussed below, copyright is 
                                                 
Online Removal Guide, CYBER CIVIL RIGHTS INITIATIVE, 
http://www.endrevengeporn.org/online-removal/ (last visited Dec. 28, 2017) 
(offering resources to victims that include steps on how to report an incident). 
190 See sources supra note 189. 
191 17 U.S.C. § 512(c) (2012). 
192 Id.  
193 “Under the knowledge standard, a service provider is eligible for the limitation on 
liability, only if it does not have actual knowledge of the infringement, is not aware 
of facts or circumstances from which infringing activity is apparent, or upon gaining 
such knowledge or awareness, responds expeditiously to take the material down or 
block access to it.” U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, THE DIGITAL MILLENNIUM COPY ACT 
OF 1998: U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE SUMMARY 12 (Dec 1998) 
https://www.copyright.gov/legislation/dmca.pdf. 
194 Id. at 11.  
195 Digital Millennium Copyright Act § 202, 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2012). 
196 See 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2012); see also CITRON, supra note 35, at 19, 172 (stating 
that many Non-Consensual Pornography sites ignore requests to remove content 
Donohue  
282  U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS [VOL. 17:2 
 
deemed to reside with the author of a work, and with photographs this 
traditionally means the photographer.197 This makes DCMA take-down 
protections inaccessible for many subjects of Non-Consensual 
Pornography: for example, those who consented in the first instance to 
their photo being taken by someone, but did not intend to see the photos 
distributed; those who consented to their photos being taken by one 
party only to have those photos stolen by a third party and distributed 
without their consent; those whose photographs were taken 
unbeknownst to them; those whose self-authored photographs were 





Copyright has dual purposes which, on a certain level seem in 
competition with one another, and neither of which prove to assist the 
subjects of Non-Consensual Pornography. First, copyright is designed 
to “promote public disclosure and dissemination of works of 
‘authorship.’”199 Any intervention or critique that deems to restrict 
access or limit distribution of content might be considered contrary to 
the spirit of copyright.200 Second, copyright gives authors the right to 
“restrict or deny distribution of their work.”201 Here, we might hope to 
find some cover for subjects of Non-Consensual Pornography, but the 
interpretation of authorship does not always favor subjects of Non-
Consensual Pornography.202  
When the courts first began to wrangle with the notion of 
copyright for photography, the dominate concern was to determine what 
                                                 
because they assume victims cannot afford an attorney to follow through on a 
copyright infringement claim). 
197 See infra Section IV.A.1. 
198 See 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 107 (2012) (defining key terms in copyright law and 
limitations on fair use); see also, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, CIRCULAR 14.1013, 
COPYRIGHT IN DERIVATIVE WORKS AND COMPILATIONS (2013), 
copyright.gov/circs/circ14.pdf. 
199 Peter Jaszi, Toward a Theory of Copyright: The Metamorphoses of Authorship, 
1991 DUKE L.J. 455, 463 (1991). 
200 Id. at 463–64. 
201 Id. at 463. 
202 Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 54–55 (1884) (defining 
an author as an “originator,” or “he to whom anything owes its origin”). 
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it meant to author a photograph.203 Photographs were proving to charm 
the public. Lithography companies hoped to reproduce these marketable 
items with unrestrained abandon.204 The photographers, naturally, 
objected.205 Those wishing to reproduce the photos argued that there 
could be no author of a photograph as the photograph was merely a 
product of a mechanical operation.206 Such a production stood in stark 
contrast, the argument continued, to a traditional work of art- a painting 
or a sculpture- something “imbued with something of the human 
soul.”207 A machine-produced work was, in contrast, “soulless.”208  
Thus, at least initially, the photographer disappeared into the 
machine; but she was not lost to this analysis for long. By 1862, French 
courts began to tout the theory that authorship could be assigned to any 
work, including a photograph so long as it bore the “imprint of 
personality.” 209 By the 1880s, this same logic showed up in American 
courts; for example, in a famous case concerning “Oscar Wilde, No. 
18,” a portrait of the author by photographer Napoleon Sarony.210 In 
finding for Mr. Sarony against the Burrow-Giles Lithographic 
company, a company that had produced 85,000 unauthorized copies of 
the portrait for sale, the court commented: 
 
The plaintiff made a [useful, new, harmonious, characteristic, 
and graceful picture] entirely from his own mental conception, 
to which he gave visible form by posing the said Osar Wilde in 
front of the camera, selecting and arranging the costume, 
draperies, and other various accessories in said photograph, 
arranging and disposing the light and shade, suggesting and 
evoking the desired expression, and from such disposition, 
                                                 
203 See Jaszi, supra note 199, at 455. (describing the “foundational and resonant” 
concept of copyright reprint).  
204 See JANE M. GAINES, CONTESTED CULTURE: THE IMAGE, THE VOICE & THE LAW 
71 (1991) (discussing the rise of new technologies; specially, photography and 
cinema, and the unresponsiveness of the legal system); Jaszi, supra note 199, at 473 
(describing how there was “commercialization and commodification” of print culture 
in general in the eighteenth century). 
205 E.g., GAINES, supra note 204, at 52 (noting that Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. 
was charged with producing 85,000 unauthorized copies of Oscar Wilde, No. 18). 
206 Id. at 46–47. 
207 Id. at 46.  
208 Id. 
209Id. at 47.  
210 Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Saron, 111 U.S. 55, 60 (1884). 
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arrangement, or representation, made entirely by the plaintiff, he 
produced the picture in suit.211  
 
And so it went that while the case purposefully declared that “we 
decide nothing” in regards to ordinary photos, the case came to stand 
for the principle of copyrightability for all photography.212 In both the 
early U.S. courts and French courts, investment of personality “is the 
crucial authorial deposit that turns preexisting material and immaterial 
property into intellectual property.”213 Yet U.S. courts were applying 
the analysis of Burrow-Giles and similar progeny to all photographs, 
and by 1909 the Copyright Act the United States codified and clarified 
protection for photographs “without regard to the degree of 
‘personality’ which enters into them.”214  
In many respects, we might be comfortable with the progression 
away from imprecise and illusory focus on personality. Ansel Adams, 
for example, need not defend an attack that his famous photograph of 
the Tetons and Snake River215 was nothing more than the output of a 
mechanical operation by explaining how the picture depicts his 
personality. Rather, he can insist that “[y]ou don’t take a photograph, 
you make it”216 and we can believe him or, at least as a matter of 
copyright, leave him alone.217  
                                                 
211 Id. at 60.  
212 See GAINES, supra note 204, at 55–56 (arguing that, despite the Court’s silence 
with respect to ordinary photos, the case stood for the copyrightability of all “works 
of authorship,” including photographs). 
213 Id. at 51 (discussing two French and American cases where “the investment of 
personality is the crucial authorial deposit that turns preexisting material and 
immaterial property into intellectual property”). 
214 See GAINES, supra note 204, at 51 (discussing two French and American cases 
where “the investment of personality is the crucial authorial deposit that turns 
preexisting material and immaterial property into intellectual property”).  
215 Ansel Adams, Tetons and Snake River (photograph), 
http://www.getty.edu/art/collection/objects/258882/ansel-adams-the-tetons-and-
the-snake-river-grand-teton-national-park-wyoming-american-negative-1942-
print-1980/ (last visited Dec. 31, 2016). 
216 While the original context of this quotation is unknown, the Contemporary 
Quotations Project at the American University School of Communications has 
verified it. On Photography, CONTEMPORARY QUOTATIONS, 
http://www.contemporaryquotations.org/quote/photography (last updated Dec. 7, 
2017). 
217 Copyright Act of 1909, Pub.L. 60–349, 35 Stat. 1075 (amended by Copy Right 
Act of 1976, and codified as 17 U.S.C. 102) (stating that copyright protection applies 
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The departure from consideration of personalities was not 
without casualty. If the conversation about personality had continued 
with nuance then it may well have tracked with the logic or 
considerations of certain commentators: it is not just the photographer 
that invests herself when she decided how to pose a subject or light the 
scene, but also the person in the image who certainly brings something 
of their personality to bear on the creative outcome.218 Even from these 
early days, scholars argued if photographer and the photographed are 
each in possession of themselves, each must be able to claim property 
in an image that contains personality.219 And indeed, a photographer 
profiting from reproduction of portrait prints troubled early courts. In 
Pollard v. The Photographic Co. the Court of Chancery (United 
Kingdom) declared that “a person whose photograph is taken by a 
photographer is not [] deserted by the law.”220 The notion that 
personality, and by extension authorship, might somehow be 
collaborative is one that current copyright does not account for well.221 
                                                 
to “original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression”). 
Works of authorship, in turn, include: literary works, musical works, dramatic 
works, pantomimes and choreographic works, pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, 
motion pictures and audiovisual works, and sound recordings, and ultimately 
architectural works. Id. 
218 See GAINES, supra note 204, at 81–82 (“An object is not property unless it is 
produced by a (creative) subject—by an author who intervenes in the mechanical—
industrial production of the photograph, who ‘invests’ his personality in the real 
before the camera . . . And although in itself can be transferred to another party via 
contract (so the facial image can be owned by a second legal entity), the legal 
subjecthood of the person in the image still stands as a guarantee of personal 
property right in the abstract.”).  
219 See GAINES, supra note 204, at 82 (discussing the theory that both the 
photographed and the photographer are “in possession of themselves” and each of 
them can assert property rights to an image that has “personality”). 
220 Cf. Pollard v. Photographic Co., 40 Ch. Div. 345 (1888) (finding in favor of the 
subject of a photograph, a “lady[] shocked by finding that the photographer she 
employed to take her likeness of her own use is publicly exhibiting and selling 
copies thereof” via contract law, not copyright law). In this case, the court reasoned 
that, based on the terms of the employment contract between the photographer and 
Mrs. Pollard, and absent any expressed agreement in writing, the subject of the 
photograph owned the copyright, not the photographer. Id. at 349. 
221 Peter Jaszi, On the Author Effect: Contemporary Copyright and Collective 
Creativity, in THE CONSTRUCTION OF AUTHORSHIP: TEXTUAL APPROPRIATION IN 
LAW AND LITERATURE 51 (Martha Woodmansee & Peter Jaszi eds., 1994) (stating 
that case law and copyright statutes interpret joint authorship as a “deviant form of 
individual ‘authorship’”). 
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Collaboration in the most basic sense is not                                                                                                                                                           
necessarily protected by copyright law, let alone collaboration of 
personalities in the theoretical sense.222  
Be that as it may, copyright for photographs and by extension 
video, developed as it did and author has come to mean person taking 
the “shot.”223 This resting point is highly problematic for subjects of 
Non-Consensual Pornography who did not take the picture that is being 
disseminated. Moreover, even when a subject did take the picture being 
used, a doctored photo might amount to fair use or a copyrightable 
derivative work.224  
The recognized imprecision within the legal concept of 
authorship in copyright invites a feminist critique of authorship, because 
critical theories delight in the indeterminacy of law. In the context of 
Non-Consensual Pornography, it seems particularly problematic to 
afford the person who took the nude picture or doctored a picture, 
copyright.225 The principles of authorship speak to character of the 
work.226 Many scholars and lawyers were and remain troubled with the 
court siding with the photographer of Wilde in Burrow-Giles 
Lithographic Co. v. Sarony while the image of Wilde seems as much 
about the intrinsic Wilde-ness of the subject’s expression and demeanor 
as it does about draping and lighting.227 So too should we feel troubled 
with an insistence that a woman is not the author of a depiction of her 
                                                 
222 Id. at 52 (discussing how 1976 Copy Right Act narrows definition of “joint 
authorship” to require “the intention, at the time the writing is done, that the parts be 
absorbed or combined into an integrated unit”). See 17 U.S.C. 102 (2012) (stating 
that “copyright subsists. . . in original works of authorship. . .”). 
223 Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 61 (1884) (explaining 
that the author of the photograph was the photographer); GAINES, supra note 204, at 
52 (discussing the meaning of authorship in contemporary U.S. copyright law). 
224 See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012) (describing the fair use provisions for copyrighted 
works); 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (defining derivative works as “worked based upon 
one or more pre-existing works”). 
225 See infra Section IV.A.2. 
226 Katz v. Google, Inc., 802 F.3d 1178, 1179 (11th Cir. 2015) (articulating that 
“character” of the use of a given work is one of the factors that is accessed to 
determine fair use for purposes of contemporary copyright law). 
227 Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co., 11 U.S. at 60 (explaining the photograph was 
“an original work of art”); See GAINES supra note 204, at 51 (discussing varying 
opinions about the weight of Burrow-Giles v. Sarony on contemporary copyright 
law). 
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own body, particularly where that body might have been be captured in 
its most private of moments and intimate of expressions. 
To be certain, it would be unprecedented, or at least violate 
precedent since 1884, to assert that a subject of Non-Consensual 
Pornography is in fact the author of her image and therefore can be said 
to have copyright.228 But is there not sufficient motivation to reject this 
precedent or deny its applicability to the specific facts? Consider that: 
 
Lines of precedent fully developed before women were 
permitted to vote, continued while women were not allowed to 
learn to read and write, sustained under a reign of sexual terror 
and abasement and silence and misrepresentation continuing to 
the present day are considered valid bases for defeating 
“unprecedented” interpretations or initiatives from women’s 
point of view.229 
 
 While, copyright busies itself, as we just have, with the 
consideration of the character of a given work,230 the very existence of 
copyright as a legal concept is not really about identifying and 
protecting artistic expression, but rather is due to commercial 
importance of asserting a copyright.231 The agenda of those in 
opposition to reimaging authorship is likely a concern that reimagining 
would have dramatic ripple effects on their market interests.232 Let us 
                                                 
228 Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co., 11 U.S. at 61.  
229 See MACKINNON, supra note 172, at 238.  
230 Katz v. Google, Inc., 802 F.3d 1178, 1178 (11th Cir. 2015) (articulating that 
“character” of the use of a given work is one of the factors that is accessed to 
determine fair use); see GAINES, supra note 204, at 51 (“…Burrow-Giles remains a 
definitive statement on “originality” in manually as well mechanically produced 
works.”). 
231 GAINES, supra note 204, at 50; see also 47 U.S.C. § 230 (b)(2) (2012) (stating 
that it is U.S. policy “to preserve the vibrant and competitive free market”). There is 
concern or resistance about re-enlisting copyright law to promote content control. 
Danny O’Brien, Breaking Section 230’s Intermediary Liability Protection Won’t Fix 
Harassment, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. (Oct. 2, 2015), 
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2015/10/breaking-section-230s-intermediary-liability-
protections-wont-fix-harassment. 
232 See Katz, 802 F.3d. at 1184 (stating “the ‘central question’ is whether . . . the use 
would cause substantive economic harm such that allowing [the conduct] would 
frustrate the purpose of copyright”). When applied to a case of a disgruntled business 
man, prioritizing market harm may make a certain sense. However, allowing a carve 
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consider then the competing market interests in Non-Consensual 
Pornography and Sexualized Cyber Harassment.  
On the one hand, it is undeniable that Non-Consensual 
Pornography specifically and pornography generally have a robust 
market.233 Globally, pornography generally is a $97 billion industry, 
with the United States controlling approximately $10-12 billion of 
that.234 At its peak, an ISP dedicated to revenge porn, IsAnyoneUp.com, 
had thirty million views a month.235 And it’s pay-per-click advertising 
module generated $1,200 a month. 236 Not satisfied with advertising 
revenues, some revenge porn site found another angle for profits, 
namely offering to remove content for a fee, and a greater fee for 
expedited removal.237 The ISPs are not the only ones profiting in this 
market. One of the most prominent advertisers on the revenge porn ISPs 
are those in the “image scrubber” business; these businesses offer to 
assist with removal for a fee.238 Prominent businesses charge tens-of-
thousands of dollars for the service.239 When we give posters of Non-
Consensual Pornography authorship of the content, when we shield ISP, 
                                                 
out to protect markets and failing to provide a carve out for sexualized, often violent 
content, rings hallow when weighted against the calls for safety and equality, which 
is central narrative of those targeted by Non-Consensual Pornography. See infra 
Section IV.A.2. 
233 cnbc.com, Things Are Looking Up in America’s Porn Industry, NBC NEWS BUS. 
(Jan. 20, 2015, 8:17 AM), http://www.nbcnews.com/business/business-news/things-
are-looking-americas-porn-industry-n289431 (citing Kassia Wosick, assistant 
professor of sociology at New Mexico State University). 
234 Id. 




237 The revenge porn website MyEx.com says it will remove the image 24–48 hours 
after people pay. Bort, supra note 73. Kevin Christopher Bollaert had a revenge porn 
website and charged victims to take the images down. Tynan, supra note 73. He 
earned around $30,000 from people who paid to remove the image. Id.  
238 Reputation repair charges $14,459 for expedited removal and future attack 
prevention and IMC Media Direct charges $6,300 reputation control service positive 
press releases so the negative searches go further into google space. Tynan, supra 
note 73. A reputation manager can earn $5,00–20,000 per month per client and 
charge upwards of $10,00 a month to work on name space (person’s name). Id. See 
Bort, supra note 73. 
239 See Bort, supra note 73. 
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we give these actors voice and control in that market.240 Even if we 
accept for the sake of argument that the Non-Consensual Pornography 
market is a valuable market whose interests we should defend, the fact 
remains that it is not the only market in operation; the blind belief that 
it is subverts the needs and interests of those with stakes in a different 
market, the market in one’s own body.  
An individual has a market in her body. In a most concrete sense, 
a woman can choose to sell use of her body as a surrogate or an egg 
donor.241 She can sell her services to her family: women 
disproportionately care for children and aging parents.242 She can 
choose to bodily enter the labor market.243 Indeed, the pornography 
market generally belies the suggestion that women swept up in the Non-
Consensual Pornography market have no interest in the use of their 
                                                 
240 See Tynan, supra note 73; Kevin Roose, At Home with a Revenge Porn Mogul, 
SPLINTER (Jan. 12, 2016 3:50 PM), https://splinternews.com/at-home-with-a-
revenge-porn-mogul-1793854053 (profiling Scott Breitenstein, owner and moderator 
of ComplaintsBuerau.com, a page that hosted Non-Consensual Pornography). When 
individuals would attempt to “file copyright claims for their nude photos under the 
Digital Millennium Copyright Act” in an attempt to get images removed from the 
site. . . hoping to get them taken down. [Breitenstein] would sue them for $10,900 in 
“defamation” costs. Id. However, in 2015 Breitenstein halted this practice. Id.; see 
also Terms and Conditions, COMPLAINTSBUREAU.COM, 
http://www.complaintsbureau.com/term-of-use (last visited Dec. 29, 2017) (“To all 
patrons and individuals, familiar with Complaints Bureau.com. The website was 
recently the subject of a documentary film which will air on the Fusion Network 
with host Kevin Roose, in a few months. We, as site operators, now fully understand 
the damage and negativity that ‘Revenge Porn’ can cause. We are now removing 
All/Any/Every ‘Revenge Porn’ and/or sexually related material, from the website. 
We are also banning it to ever be allowed, at any time, in the future. If you are 
caught trying to post this type of material, you will be banned immediately and 
permantly [sic], without notice.”). 
241 See, e.g., Donna De La Cruz, Should Young Women Sell Their Eggs?, N.Y. TIMES 
(Oct. 20, 2016), www.nytimes.com/2016/10/20/well/family/young-women-egg-
donors.html?mcubz=0 (sharing statistics and details about the procedure of egg 
donation). 
242 Women and Caregiving: Facts and Figures, FAMILY CAREGIVER ALL., (Dec. 31, 
2003), https://www.caregiver.org/women-and-caregiving-facts-and-figures. 
243 TIAN SHAPIRO, DEMOCRATIC JUSTICE 145 (2001) (explaining that when a laborer 
enters the market she sets the use of her productive capacities, which affirms the 
laborers sense of self-ownership). 
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bodies. Female pornography actors are paid for their performance244 and 
use of their likeness; in fact, it is one of the few industries that pays 
women more than men, an acknowledgement that the appetite for 
pornography has something to do with the appetite for the female 
body.245 When entering the labor market, one capitalizes on their 
appearance, their reputation, and their relationships (contacts and 
connections).246 Non-Consensual Pornography and Sexualized Cyber 
Harassment compromise all of this.247 Some of those advocating and 
legislating against Non-Consensual Pornography in the criminal arena 
recognize the connection between the crime and the subject’s market 
value in herself.248 In Hawaii, for example, the intent provision of the 
statute reads: “with the intent to harm substantially the depicted person 
with respect to that person’s health, safety, business, calling, career, 
financial condition, reputation, or personal relationships.”249 Yet in the 
civil arena, there is no corollary concern for one’s calling, career, or 




In 1953, the Second Circuit of the United States Court of 
Appeals named a new right “in addition to and independent of [the] right 
of privacy.”251 This right, the right of publicity, recognized that a person 
should have the right to the publicity value of her photograph.252 The 
                                                 
244 Chris Morris, Porn’s Dirtiest Secret: What Everyone Gets Paid, CNBC (Jan. 20, 
2016 7:35 AM), http://www.cnbc.com/2016/01/20/porns-dirtiest-secret-what-
everyone-gets-paid.html. 
245 Id. 
246 See Citron & Franks, supra note 33, at 352 (discussing the importance of 
perceived “reputation” on hiring decisions in the context of Non-Consensual 
Pornography). 
247 Id. (“The professional costs of revenge porn are steep. Because Internet searches 
of victims’ names prominently display their naked images or videos, many lose their 
jobs. . . . Victims may be unable to find work at all. Most employers rely on 
candidates’ online reputations as an employment screen.”). 
248 Id. 
249 HAW. REV. STAT § 711-1110.9(b) (2017). 
250 See Katz v. Google, Inc., 802 F.3d 1178 (11th Cir. 2015) (holding that a photo 
could be utilized if there was no impact on any actual or potential market).  
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court’s analysis was prefaced on the fact that the image in question was 
one of a famous baseball player and that the court could envision that a 
famous person would have an interest in protecting their ability to 
“receive[ ] money for authorizing advertisements, popularizing their 
countenances, displayed in newspapers, magazines, busses, trains and 
subways.”253  
The right of publicity is an “outgrowth” of the right of 
privacy.254 The line between the two rights appears to be one based on 
the nature of the harm suffered: 
 
[t]he appropriation type of invasion of privacy, like all privacy 
rights, centers on damage to human dignity. Damages are 
usually measured by “mental distress”—some bruising of the 
human psyche. On the other hand, the right of publicity relates 
to commercial damage to the business value of human identity. 
Put simplistically, while infringement of the right of publicity 
looks to an injury to the pocketbook, an invasion of 
appropriation privacy looks to an injury to the psyche.255   
 
The differentiation between the right to privacy and the right to 
publicity hints at the laws deference to market forces.256 If the use of 
one’s image affronts an average citizen, there is an inquiry into the 
defendant’s intentions, the plaintiff’s reaction, and consideration of 
objective standards of reasonableness.257 Right to publicity, meanwhile, 
simply asks: was an image for which there is a market used; and did the 
user pay or contract for it?258 For celebrities or those with obvious 
                                                 
253 Id. 
254 Eric E. Johnson, Disentangling the Right of Publicity, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 891, 
896–97. However, Johnson cautions against an overly simplistic view of the 
evolution of the right of publicity. Id. at 898. 
255 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR 
COMPETITION § 28:6 (4th ed. 1997).  
256 Rosemary J. Coombe, Authorizing the Celebrity, in THE CONSTRUCTION OF 
AUTHORSHIP: TEXTUAL APPROPRIATION IN LAW AND LITERATURE 103 (Martha 
Woodmansee & Peter Jaszi eds., 1994).  
257 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS INTRUSION UPON SECLUSION § 652B (AM. 
LAW INST. 1977). 
258 Haelan Labs., Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866, 868 (2d Cir. 
1953). But see Allison v. Vintage Sports Plaques, 136 F.3d 1443, 1449 (11th Cir. 
1998) (discussing first-sale doctrine). 
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markets in their identity, various uses of their image may give rise to 
claims under both right of privacy and rights of publicity doctrines.259 
The same cannot be said for the average citizen, and by extension many 
subjects of Non-Consensual Pornography.260  
Meanwhile, the fixation with market seems to forsake the very 
people that so motivated Warren and Brandeis’s analysis: the private 
person. Consider that Warren and Brandeis were apoplectic over the 
notion that “gossip [might] attain[ ] the dignity of print, and crowd[ ] 
the space available for matters of real interest to the community:”261 
 
The press is overstepping in every direction the obvious bounds 
of propriety and of decency. Gossip is no longer the resource of 
the idle and of the vicious, but has become a trade, which is 
pursued with industry as well as effrontery. To satisfy a prurient 
taste the details of sexual relations are spread broadcast in the 
columns of the daily papers. To occupy the indolent, column 
upon column is filled with idle gossip, which can only be 
procured by intrusion upon the domestic circle. . . In this, as in 
other branches of commerce, the supply creates the demand. 
Each crop of unseemly gossip, thus harvested, becomes the seed 
of more, and, in direct proportion to its circulation, results in the 
lowering of social standards and of morality. Even gossip 
apparently harmless, when widely and persistently circulated, is 
potent for evil. It both belittles and perverts. It belittles by 
inverting the relative importance of things, thus dwarfing the 
thoughts and aspirations of a people . . . Easy of comprehension, 
appealing to that weak side of human nature which is never 
wholly cast down by the misfortunes and frailties of our 
neighbors, no one can be surprised that it usurps the place of 
interest in brains capable of other things. Triviality destroys at 
once robustness of thought and delicacy of feeling. No 
                                                 
259 Haelan Labs., 202 F.2d at 868; See also Coombe, supra note 256, at 102 (stating 
the Anglo-American legal jurisdictions permit individuals to “protect publically 
identifiable attributes from unauthorized and unremunerated appropriation by 
others). 
260 See Coombe, supra note 256, at 104 (stating “[m]arket values arise only after 
property rights have been established and enforced”).  
261 See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 158, at 193. 
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enthusiasm can flourish, no generous impulse can survive under 
its blighting influence.262 
 
One can only imagine how Warren and Brandeis might 
comprehend the capacity of the web to canvas vast available space with 
“details of sexual relations.”263 Consider how the arc of Non-
Consensual Pornography so often plays out.264 The subjects of Non-
Consensual Pornography become (always) involuntary and (often) 
unwitting stars in a display.265 A woman’s body is taken, manipulated, 
displayed, and used.266 Because her stardom is not formalized in any 
way and often plays out in underground settings, she does not achieve 
a celebrity status that the court would recognize and so she is entitled to 
none of the protections or entitlements that celebrities enjoy.267 
Celebrity status, as understood and protected by the courts, is essentially 
a protection of worth and degree: you do not matter until you start to 
matter to a public; nothing has been taken from you until you can 
establish you were worth taking.268 Just as the feminist perspective 
questions the focus on degree in critiquing distribution requirements in 
criminal codes, so too does it push back here.269 Nonetheless, right of 
publicity actions contemplate the market for images narrowly: “it does 
not invest a prominent person with the right to exploit financially every 
public use of name or picture (let alone a person of no prominence).”270 
It is only when such use is made “for advertising purposes, or for the 
purposes of trade”271 
                                                 
262 Id. at 196.  
263 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 158; see also Section 230 of the Communications 
Decency Act, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND., https://www.eff.org/issues/cda230 
(last visited Dec. 29, 2017) (stating that Facebook alone has more than 1 billion 
users, and YouTube users upload 100 hours of video every minute). 
264 See supra Part I, II.  
265 See supra Part I, II. 
266 See MACKINNON, supra note 172, at 138. 
267 See Jarvis, supra note 120 (explaining how a recent $8.9 million verdict in a 
cyber stalking and Non-Consensual Pornography case was “was a record for a 
cyberharassment case that didn’t involve a celebrity.”). 
268 Haelan Labs., Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866, 868 (2d Cir. 
1953). 
269 See supra Section III.B. 
270 Ann Margaret v. High Society Mag., 498 F.Supp. 401, 406 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) 
(bringing suit after defendants used a nude image of the actress taken from a movie). 
271 Id. 
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A feminist perspective rejects prioritizing the notion of place or 
status in the public sphere as being determinative of whether one enjoys 
protection.272 The public sphere, after all, is not a location or a visual 
space; rather it is “system of ideas that promote the interests of some 
while ignoring or marginalizing those of other.”273 Meanwhile, “over 
time, women have been. . . disenfranchised and excluded from public 
life.”274 Yet given the insistence in law that public and private selves 
are two separate spheres, can a subject of Non-Consensual Pornography 
at least find shelter when focusing on a privacy right? The answer is, 
unsettlingly, only a qualified yes. 
 
3. Privacy & Third-Party Liability 
 
Intrusion of privacy claims require the showing that: 1) the 
defendant must have intentionally invaded the private affairs of the 
plaintiff without authorization; 2) the invasion must be offensive to a 
reasonable person; 3) the matter that the defendant intruded upon must 
involve a private matter; 4) the intrusion must have caused mental 
anguish or suffering to the plaintiff.275 Certainly when one considers the 
harm associated with Non-Consensual Pornography, one quickly 
realizes that it is an assault on the subject’s personhood.276 Given the 
difficulty in linking personhood to authorship, can we revisit notions of 
personhood as a matter of privacy instead?  
According to one of the earliest articulations of privacy, the 
answer is a resounding yes.277 Warren and Brandeis argued in 1890, that 
“[t]he right of one who has remained a private individual, to prevent his 
public portraiture, presents the simplest case for [ ] extension”278 of the 
                                                 
272 Coombe, supra note 256, at 104 (stating “[m]arket values arise only after 
property rights have been established and enforced” and then going on to argue that 
“the decision to allocate particular property rights is a prior question of social policy 
that requires philosophical and moral deliberations and a consideration of social 
costs and benefits.”); Griffin, supra note 77, at 8. 
273 Griffin, supra note 77, at 8. 
274 See MACKINNON, supra note 172, at 160. Other feminist scholars question the 
division of life into two spheres. See Griffin supra note 77, at 10. 
275 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS: INTRUSION UPON SECLUSION § 652B (AM. 
LAW INST. 1977). 
276 CITRON, supra note 35, at 81–82. 
277 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 158, at 213. 
278 Id. 
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protections against the unauthorized dissemination of “handiwork;”279 
and that moreover “[t]he principle which protects personal writings and 
any other productions of the intellect or the emotions, is the right to 
privacy, and the law has no new principle to formulate when it extends 
this protection to the personal appearance.”280 After all, they concluded, 
“the right to privacy, as a part of the more general right to the immunity 
of the person, -- the right to one's personality”281 and certainly if one 
argues that one’s personality is bound up in her writings or her 
drawings, how can one argue her personality is absent from her very 
likeness?282 
 The trouble with privacy claims is that we do not just ask, as we 
might with reproduction of a celebrity likeness: is that her likeness? did 
she consent?283 Rather we ask a more complicated litany of questions: 
is that her likeness? Is there something about that likeness that makes 
us believe there are privacy interests at play? Is this type of invasion of 
a privacy interest offensive? Are we sure the invasion was into a private 
affair? Are we sure he meant to invade her privacy in this way?284 This 
concern about the circumstances and the nature of the intrusion feels 
reminiscent to intent provisions of some criminal Non-Consensual 
Pornography laws and conjures up similar critiques.285 As criminal 
Non-Consensual Pornography laws have been imagined, legislated, and 
tested, the public and the court ask a lot about the nature of the 
relationship between the defendant and the victim.286 The inquiry with 
privacy claims is even more intense; the claim must analyze what the 
defendant intended, but also the subjective nature of the intrusion and 
                                                 
279 Id. at 214.  
280 Id. at 213. 
281 Id. at 207. 
282 Reasoning can be applied to celebrities and those with a market in their likeness. 
See Haelan Labs., Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866, 868 (2d Cir. 
1953) (holding that the right to publication of a picture could be subject to exclusive 
rights). 
283 Id. at 867–68. But see Allison v. Vintage Sports Plaques, 136 F.3d 1443, 1449 
(11th Cir. 1998) (discussing first-sale doctrine). 
284 See Franks, supra note 28 (“Having to prove intent to harm or harass beyond a 
reasonable doubt will not only be practically impossible for those victimized by 
strangers; it will often be very difficult in domestic violence cases as well, as 
perpetrators can claim a number of plausible alternative motives.”). 
285 See supra Section III.B. 
286 See supra Section III.A. 
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whether it was objectively offensive.287 This, like the query into intent 
in criminal settings, will all too likely invite inquiry into the defendant 
and subject’s prior interactions and communications.288 A feminist 
perspective asks why.289  
Women are not paid for their participation in Non-Consensual 
Pornography productions; the dramas play out in a medium defended as 
a space for (men’s) private musing/moments.290 Therefore, women are 
not afforded a public right of action and there is no public outcry.291 If 
women attempt to articulate the public nature of the Non-Consensual 
Pornography happenings by linking the harm of Non-Consensual 
Pornography to their own sense of public self (our market: reputation, 
participation in job market, her right to brand her own sexual identity 
and choice),292 it is ignored or undermined by a legal system that cannot 
comprehend it.293 And so the subject pivots and describes the harm as 
critically private, an invasion of a very private (sexual, maybe naked) 
self.294 Here the law allows our defendant to claim the private moments 
were never private- she was promiscuous, she was available- thus 
eroding her privacy action because “[n]o law takes away women’s 
privacy[; m]ost women do not have any to take, and no law gives them 
what they do not already have.”295 Non-Consensual Pornography, 
                                                 
287 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS: INTRUSION UPON SECLUSION § 652B (AM. 
LAW INST. 1977). 
288 See supra Section III.B. 
289 See CHAMALLAS, supra note 152, at 21. 
290 See MACKINNON, supra note 172, at 230–31. Terry Bollea, known professionally 
as Hulk Hogan, sued media company Gawker for distributing a sex tap depicting 
him and his ex-wife. Gawker Media, LLC v. Bollea, 129 So.3d 1196, 1198 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 2d Dist. 2014). The suit bankrupted Gawker, and a bankruptcy judge 
authorized a $31 million settlement. Matt Drange & Ryan Mac, Judge Approves $31 
Million To Hulk Hogan In Gawker Liquidation Plan, FORBES (Dec. 13, 2016), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/ryanmac/2016/12/13/judge-approves-gawker-
settlement-as-hulk-hogan-is-set-to-be-paid/#559a9cd55db9. 
291 Griffin, supra note 77, at 31 (“‘Famous’ people are set in opposition to the 
‘common’ person, with scholarly attention given to the former.”). 
292 CITRON, supra note 35, at 39–45. 
293 Id. at 162. 
294 See CITRON, supra note 35, at 49 (describing a subject of revenge porn who quite 
rightly had trusted her video chats and photo exchanges with her long-term, long-
distance boyfriend were confidential). 
295 See MACKINNON, supra note 172, at 239. 
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nestled safety in the false dichotomy between public and private, sits 
immune.296 
At least the difficulties with privacy claims for subjects of Non-
Consensual Pornography, whether be they legal or critogenic,297 are not 
insurmountable, but there is still the question of how these actions might 
be available to the subjects of Non-Consensual Pornography as against 
the ISPs. Here, we see the more dire situations for subjects of Non-
Consensual Pornography, because the existence of third party liability 
shields make the very people in control of offensive content judgment 
proof.298 
 
4. Third Party Liability & The Communication Decency Act 
 
Harkening back to our hypothetical above, we, as the subject of 
the Non-Consensual Pornography, had been confronted with more 
images as the months waned on.299 Some were on various social media 
sites; others were on random websites, some of which were explicitly 
pornographic; and still others were on websites lurking at the fringe of 
the visible web and the “deep” or invisible web.300 A first move, we 
understand implicitly when we assume the position of the subject of 
Non-Consensual Pornography, is to try and have content removed. The 
                                                 
296 The “[r]ealm of private freedom becomes realm of women’s collective 
subordination.” MACKINNON, supra note 172, at 168. (stating that this bind that 
subjects of Non-Consensual Pornography find themselves in when attempting to 
articulate a right to publicity and copyright claims, or alternatively privacy, illustrate 
the problems with this essentialized, dichotomous thinking); Griffin, supra note 77, 
at 7 (stating that essentialism is a source of dichotomous thinking: one thing must be 
the opposite of, or different from another. Historically, private and public spheres are 
set apart as opposites).  
297 See, e.g., Thomas Gutheil et al., Preventing “Critogenic” Harms: Minimizing 
Emotional Injury From Civil Litigation, 28 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 5, 11 (2000). And of 
course, there is the reality that suing someone is rarely quick, easy, or affordable; 
three things one would want a remedy to be if we care about helping people in crisis. 
See Citron & Franks, supra note 33, at 358. 
298 See CITRON, supra note 35, at 170–71. (discussing the liability shield in 47 
U.S.C. § 230(c)(1)); Electronic Frontier Found., supra note 263; see also Roose, 
supra note 240 (describing how, when informed that a woman whose image had 
been on his site, the host maintained it was “not his fault.”). 
299 See hypothetical, supra Part II 
300 See Franks, supra note 28 (“As many as 3,000 websites feature nonconsensual 
pornography, and the material is also distributed through emails, text messages, 
social media applications, and hard copies.”). 
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analysis of civil remedies above suggests that there may be action in 
civil law, albeit an imperfect one, that nonetheless would incentivize the 
poster to cease and desist. But what if, as in the hypothetical, we were 
not sure of the identity of the poster. Or what if we know our posters 
identity, but they were an abusive ex, someone with whom we want no 
contact.301 Or what if we knew who they were but not where they were; 
in other words, how and where to serve them civil process? Moreover, 
the rub with internet content is that it recycles and perpetuates often 
moving away from an original poster and into the hands of unknown 
others.302 So there are impediments to taking effective action against the 
poster.303 There is also a certain lack of logic in the notion that one 
would first pursue the poster.304 
Consider if you saw your nude picture on a poster on the side of 
a building, it being there without your consent and it being offensive to 
you. You would rip it down. When you imagine yourself as the subject 
of internet Non-Consensual Pornography, the reaction is likely no 
different. But ISPs stands between you and that proverbial wall. They 
are the gatekeeper of it.305 It is as if the wall housing the poster of your 
nude image were behind a fence surrounding the building. If the 
building was labeled with the business’s logo, would you stop, draft an 
order to the person you supposed hung the photo? No. Likely you would 
call up the business or knock on the door and ask them to take it down. 
The Communications Decency Act (CDA) then is akin to a recorded 
message telling you that you have the wrong number, or the CDA is a 
voice behind the door saying that no one is home.306  
The CDA was promulgated on the desire to “promote the 
continued development of the Internet and other interactive computer 
services and other interactive media . . . to preserve the vibrant and 
                                                 
301 Gutheil et al., supra note 297, at 11. 
302 CITRON, supra note 35, at 66–68; Franks, supra note 28. 
303 It is increasingly possible for targets of non-consensual porn, to seek expedited, 
although limited, relief through civil protection orders. See Something Can Be Done! 
Guide: Restraining Orders, WITHOUT MY CONSENT (Jan. 2017), 
http://withoutmyconsent.org/sites/default/files/wmc_restraining_orders_v1.0.pdf. 
304 SARAH JEONG, THE INTERNET OF GARBAGE loc. 660–61 (2015) (ebook) (stating 
that subjects often prioritize “ownership, control, and deletion”). 
305 See CITRON, supra note 35, at 27–30. 
306 The protections under 47 U.S.C. § 230 apply to “Internet Service Providers 
(ISPs), but also a range of ‘interactive computer service providers,’ including 
basically any online service that publishes third-party content.” Electronic Frontier 
Found., supra note 263. 
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competitive free market that presently exists for the Internet and other 
interactive computer services, unfettered by Federal or State 
regulation”307 because the bill was premised on the findings that: 
 
The Internet and other interactive computer services offer a 
forum for a true diversity of political discourse, unique 
opportunities for cultural development, and myriad avenues for 
intellectual activity. 
and 
The Internet and other interactive computer services have 
flourished, to the benefit of all Americans, with a minimum of 
government regulation . . . Increasingly Americans are relying 
on interactive media for a variety of political, educational, 
cultural, and entertainment services.308 
 
To the extent the bill was designed to offer protection against 
offensive material, the means of doing so were to first encourage the 
development of technology to enhance user control and secondarily to 
provide protection for “Good Samaritan” wishing to block and screen 
offensive material.309 These Good Samaritan ISPs were granted cover 
for “any action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict access to or 
availability of material that the provider or user considers to be obscene, 
                                                 
307 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(1) (2012). 
308 47 U.S.C. § 230(a)(1)–(5) (2012). 
309 See CDA 230: The Most Important Law Protecting Internet Speech, ELECTRONIC 
FRONTIER FOUND., https://www.eff.org/issues/cda230 (last visited Dec. 31, 2017) 
(stating that one might look to the Communications Decency Act (CDA) to consider 
its cover for those who have been subjected to objectively indecent posts and 
publications by perpetrators or facilitators of Non-Consensual Pornography. And 
indeed, the original purpose of the act was to control internet content, but this aim 
was met by strong opposition and so enter Section 230 of the CDA. Section 230 has 
been touted as “one of the most valuable tools for protecting freedom of expression 
and innovation on the Internet.” Section 230 states: “[n]o provider or user of an 
interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any 
information provided by another information content provider.”). But see Danielle 
Citron, Revenge Porn and the Uphill Battle to Pierce Section 230 Immunity (Part II), 
CONCURRING OPINIONS (Jan. 25, 2013), 
https://concurringopinions.com/archives/2013/01/revenge-porn-and-the-uphill-
battle-to-pierce-section-230-immunity-part-ii.html (stating that § 230 does not 
provide protection for unlawful content).    
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lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise 
objectionable.”310  
The action legislators imagined, though, must have been those 
actions that ISPs would take on their own volition, because while it 
allowed a safe harbor for those ISPs who might restrict or block access 
voluntarily, the CDA simultaneously dismantled a motivating influence 
for forcing reluctant ISPs’ hand by declaring that “[n]o provider or user 
of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or 
speaker of any information provided by another information content 
provider.”311 In other words, you cannot sue an ISP for hosting material 
you deem offensive or harassing, because you cannot claim that the ISP 
did or said the offensive thing.312  
People have come out aggressively against amendments to the 
CDA.313 They argue that the “CDA is currently on of the most valuable 
tools for protecting freedom of expression and innovation on the 
internet.”314 What these arguments miss, of course, is that there is 
already a current carve out to the CDA and the sky has not yet fallen.315 
Currently, copyright is the exception to the CDA.316 The CDA protects 
                                                 
310 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2)(A) (2012). 
311 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2012). This protection applies to “Internet Service Providers 
(ISPs), but also a range of ‘interactive computer service providers,’ including 
basically any online service that publishes third-party content.” Electronic Frontier 
Found., supra note 263. 
312 However, there are several provisions of the CDA that provide grounds for suing 
an ISP, and 47 U.S.C. § 230(e). See 47 U.S.C. §230(e)(1) (2012) (“No effect on 
criminal law Nothing in this section shall be construed to impair the enforcement of 
section 223 or 231 of this title, chapter 71 (relating to obscenity) or 110 (relating to 
sexual exploitation of children) of title 18, or any other Federal criminal statute.”; 
§230(e)(2) (“ No effect on intellectual property law Nothing in this section shall be 
construed to limit or expand any law pertaining to intellectual property.”); 
§230(e)(3) (“Nothing in this section shall be construed to prevent any State from 
enforcing any State law that is consistent with this section. No cause of action may 
be brought and no liability may be imposed under any State or local law that is 
inconsistent with this section.”); §230(e)(4) (2012) (“(4) No effect on 
communications privacy law Nothing in this section shall be construed to limit the 
application of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 or any of the 
amendments made by such Act, or any similar State law.”). 
313 See O’Brien, supra note 26. 
314 Id. 
315 JEONG, supra note 304, at loc. 688. 
316 Digital Millennium Copyright Act § 202, 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2012). The 
DMCA safe harbors only apply to copyright infringement, not trademark or 
patent infringement or other causes of action. Id. Most service providers, 
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third party hosts from all tort liability, except copyright.317 Lest these 
hosts be subject to constant crippling copyright actions, the DMCA 
provides a copyright safe harbor to third party hosts.318 It allows that 
hosts can avoid copyright infringement claims if they comply with 
certain protocols.319 The existence of the copyright exception to CDA 
protection, and the related DCMA limitations on copyright actions came 
about due to the lobbying force of well represented copyright owners320 
and the powerful voice of big ISPs.321 The reality is the product of 
intense negotiation between ISP and content owners, not an 
“overarching vision of the public interest.”322 
In contrast, a carve out to the CDA that allows for liability for 
the perpetuation of Non-Consensual Pornography defies the agenda of 
both big ISPs and big-market copyright owners, and it is animated 
entirely by public interest.323  First, there is rising concern about the 
public health ramifications of pornography in general, let alone 
                                                 
however, also enjoy broad immunity from most state law causes of action 
because of Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act (“CDA 
230”). See, e.g., Perfect 10 v. CCBill, LLC, 488 F.3d 1102, 1118–19 (9th Cir. 
2007) (determining that 47 U.S.C § 230 preempts all state intellectual 
property statutes, including right of publicity); Barrett v. Rosenthal, 146 P.3d 
510 (Cal. 2006). Functions Covered Under DMCA Safe Harbors: The DMCA 
safe harbors only apply to “service providers” (defined below) performing 
certain “functions” (defined in § 512(a), (b), (c) and (d)). “To qualify for these 
protections service providers must meet the conditions set forth in subsection 
[(i)], and service providers’ activities at issue must involve a function 
described in subsection (a), (b), (c), (d) or [(g)], respectively.” S. REP. NO. 
105-190 at 41 (1998). Accordingly, copyright owners have an incentive to 
characterize their lawsuits as involving activities that fall outside the defined 
functions protected by the safe harbors (e.g., intermediate copying, trans-
coding, server-side data processing). 
317 Digital Millennium Copyright Act § 202, 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2012). 
318 Digital Millennium Copyright Act § 202, 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2012). 
319 Mike Scott, Safe Harbors Under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 9 LEGIS. 
& PUB. POL’Y 99, 100 (2005). 
320 Id. at 118 
321 Id. at 100. 
322 JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT 144–45 (2001) (stating “there is no 
overarching vision of the public interest” animating the Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act. None”); Scott, supra note 319, at 118. 
323 Jane Doe v. Backpage.com LLC., 817 F.3d 12 (1st Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 
S.Ct. 622 (2017). 
Donohue  
302  U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS [VOL. 17:2 
 
pornography that, by design, aims to shame or punish.324 Second, the 
liability of several revenge porn platforms as co-conspirators in revenge 
porn seems distinguishable from those platforms that, at a remove, 
provide open space for those who wish to “speak[] up for an unpopular 
truth against powerful interests.”325 
A conversation about Non-Consensual Pornography could be a 
conversation about the tension between first amendment interests in 
digital space.326 It could be a conversation about public health.327 It 
could be a conversation about empowering targets of Non-Consensual 
Pornography and Sexualized Cyber Harassment,328 not just against the 
one bad actor who may have put the course of torment in motion, but 
against the ISP who encourage, and benefit from, online abuse.329 But 
we must be motivated to begin talking about something other than 
scumbag boyfriends and our precious daughters.330 
 
V. A CONVERSATION ABOUT CHANGE 
 
The daughter frame assigns the targets of sexually assaultive 
remarks the status of a child and finds a source for compassion and 
concern for them by arbitrarily imaging a relationship with them. The 
suggestion is that the conduct offends or concerns only when we think 
about the women conjured up by Non-Consensual Pornography and 
Sexualized Cyber Harassment as being our daughter, or the daughter of 
                                                 
324 Gail Dines, Is Porn Immoral? That Doesn’t Matter: It’s a Public Health Crisis , 
WASH. POST (Apr. 8, 2016), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2016/04/08/is-porn-immoral-
that-doesnt-matter-its-a-public-health-crisis/?utm_term=.ebe6847b2d45. 
325 See O’Brien, supra note 26 (stating that copyright exists because of the important 
commercial right of having copyright, it does not exist for victims of revenge porn). 
326 JEONG, supra note 304 at loc.781. 
327 See Dines, supra note 324. 
328 DWORKIN & MACKINNON, supra note 74, at 138. 
329 See CITRON, supra note 35, at 227–30. 
330 See, e.g., Mitt Romney (@MittRomney), TWITTER (Oct. 7, 2016, 5:10 PM), 
https://twitter.com/MittRomney/status/784546373525966849; Jeb Bush (@jebbush), 
TWITTER (Oct. 7, 2016, 4:05 PM), 
https://twitter.com/jebbush/status/784530223605903360. See also supra note 11 
(illustrating that a discussion of solutions sets is informed by our view of the 
problem. Are we only seeing scumbag boyfriends and precious daughters? Are we 
looking at a picture of sick cows only, or are we seeing everything on the periphery- 
the smoke stacks and the dirty stream water? Are we calling a veterinarian, our 
congresswoman, or both?). 
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another: She must be “a somebody” to someone else. The daughter 
frame is both not intimate enough and too narrow. Such remarks when 
directed toward specific targets are deeply personal attacks and the 
experience of them is isolating; meanwhile, the impulse to degrade and 
to own the sexual identity of women and girls touches us all. We should 
frame avoid narrow frames of the problem of sexually assaultive speech 
and action. We should not ask “what if it were your daughter?” We can 
try instead to ask, “what if it were me?” Or “what if I had done that to 
someone else?” Or “what if my son had done that to someone else?” Or 
better yet, we should ask “what if all of this humiliation and subjugation 
was happening in the world I find myself living in?”331 Because it is. 
The difficult, necessary work, then becomes, how do we imagine reform 
that animates inherent dignity and worth, concepts that are not 
positional, but universal and unalienable.  
Search engines have offered subjects of Non-Consensual 
Pornography and Cyber Harassment a door to knock or a number to call, 
so to speak, by offering mechanism to report offensive content.332 
Certain social media sites also offer users and audience members an 
opportunity to flag certain content as offensive or fraudulent and ask for 
its removal.333 These actions do not trigger an obligation for removal, 
however; and certainly no obligation for timely removal.334 If they, or 
any ISP, resists removal, a subject of Non-Consensual Pornography can 
be caught in a double bind: The only carve out to ISP’s CDA shield 
from third party liability is the DCMA copyright carve out; yet barring 
copyright reform, subjects may well struggle to prove authorship. 
Meanwhile, subjects may have viable claims under right of publicity or 
privacy rights, but without an amendment to the CDA these claims are 
not available as against the most effective defendants, the ISPs.335  
                                                 
331 See supra Part I. 
332 See, e.g., Contact Us, GOOGLE, www.google.com/contact (last visited Dec. 29, 
2017) (noting invitation to contact regarding “privacy, security and online safety”). 
333 See Reporting Abuse, FACEBOOK, 
https://www.facebook.com/help/www/1753719584844061?helpref=page_content&r
drhc (last visited Dec. 29, 2017) (using the settings tab, users can follow links to 
report offensive content). 
334 Digital Millennium Copyright Act § 202, 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2012) (requiring, but 
not defining, expeditious take-downs). 
335 JEONG, supra note 304 at loc. 661 (describing how a target of online abuse may 
not know who the poster is or how to target them directly); CITRON, supra note 35, at 
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These barriers should not be inevitable or final: “[t]he law is first 
surprised by the question and its first answer is in ‘resistance.’”336 We 
see such resistance, for example, once we initiate the conversation about 
carve out amendments to the CDA to allow third party liability for Non-
Consensual Pornography and Sexualized Cyber Harassment.337 
However, an insistence that the CDA third party liability shield is the 
only thing that stands between us and the decline of expression and 
innovation requires a belief that any adjustments to the third party 
liability shield is the same things as total elimination of it.338 Such a 
false binary closes the door to an honest exploration of the harms that 
the shield allows and nuanced thinking about how we might prevent 
certain recognized harms while upholding the principles of open, 
expressive space.339  
Let’s consider what the conversation might look like. To begin, 
we might note that Non-Consensual Pornography and Sexualized Cyber 
Harassment’s brand, if you will, is one defined by harassment and 
humiliation of a specific target where that target is an objectively non-
consenting participant.340 One particular perspective about pornography 
emerges as apt when considering Non-Consensual Pornography and 
Sexualized Cyber Harassment. Namely, “[t]he most efficient way to 
                                                 
113–19 (describing how content can be archived, recycled, and regurgitated in wider 
nets of distribution the longer is stays on an ISP’s site). 
336 See GAINES, supra note 204, at 46.  
337 See ACLU of Ariz. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Child Safety, 377 P.3d 339 (Ariz. Ct. App. 
2016) (highlighting the difficulty in obtaining disclosure of some public records). 
338 JEONG, supra note 304 at loc. 685–707. (expressing concern over a broad 
exception to the CDA while remaining open to narrowly tailored amendments which 
may benefit those sites described by Danielle Citron and others as “the worst 
actors”); See CITRON, supra note 35, at 167 (defining the worst actors online). 
339 Indeed, this is not the first time the field of Intellectual Property and Copyright 
has had to re-evaluate its position on the ability of existing legal paradigms to 
answer, or respond to emerging issues. See GAINES, supra note 204, at 46. At the 
dawn of the invention, and subsequent commercialization, of photography the “new 
technologies did not produce a communications ‘revolution’ in any sense, but they 
did pose a problem that required institutional adjustments without which defects in 
the ideological mortar would begin to show.”); Id. (highlighting that “[t]he law does 
not easily accommodate such challenges. . .”). 
340 Unsurprisingly, revenge porn has been linked to several suicides and has been 
used to blackmail and sexually exploit minors. See Dines, supra note 324; Franks, 
supra note 28.  
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[appeal to male audiences for profit]341 appears to be eroticizing the 
degradation of women.”342 Moreover,  
 
no matter what you think of pornography . . . the science [about 
the ill effects of pornography] is there. After 40 years of peer-
reviewed research, scholars can say with confidence that porn is 
an industrial product that shapes how we think about gender, 
sexuality, relationships, intimacy, sexual violence and gender 
equality — for the worse.343  
 
One study, for example, revealed a correlation between regular porn use 
amongst teenage boys and their seeing females as “play things.”344 
Another study found that male and female college students who 
reported recently watching pornography also reported believing that 
only strangers commit sexual assault and that victims “ask for it” by 
wearing “slutty” clothes and going out alone.345 Conversations about 
these realities may support suggestions such as amending the CDA 
prohibit immunity for ISPs specifically designated for Non-Consensual 
Pornography, or where the ISP has been put on notice that the content 
was posted without consent.346 In a similar vein, we might consider 
requiring ISPs in the pornography business to certify the consent of 
anyone depicted before such content will be posted. Such conversations 
                                                 
341 ORENSTEIN, supra note 32, at 34 (explaining the main goal of pornography 
producers is to appeal to male audiences). 
342 Id. (observing that a high percentage of pornographic scenes containing 
physically aggressive acts towards women). 
343 Dines, supra note 324. 
344 See ORENSTEIN, supra note 32, at 36. 
345 Id. 
346 See Fair Housing Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.Com, LLC, 521 
F.3d. 1157, 1165 (9th Cir. 2008) (stating “the dissent tilts at windmills when it 
shows, quite convincingly, that Roommate's subscribers are information content 
providers who create the profiles by picking among options and providing their own 
answers. There is no disagreement on this point. But, the fact that users are 
information content providers does not preclude Roommate from also being an 
information content provider by helping ‘develop’ at least ‘in part’ the information 
in the profiles. As we explained in Batzel, the party responsible for putting 
information online may be subject to liability, even if the information originated 
with a user.”); see also Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1033 (9th Cir. 2003); Mary 
Anne Franks, The Lawless Internet? Myths and Misconceptions About CDA Section 
230, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 18, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/mary-anne-
franks/section-230-the-lawless-internet_b_4455090.html. 
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would inspire fashioning take-down protocols beyond the one that the 
DMCA legislates. We might insist that consent, not just copyright, 
should inform mandated take-down protocols where a post contains 
naked or sexualized content of target.347 Further, we would concern 
ourselves with the speed of take-downs to minimize the risk of recycled 
content. 
If we can recognize, articulate, and value the market that a 
person has in her own body; then we can find the language to advocate 
for the reform that empowers subjects of Non-Consensual Pornography 
against those that harbor posts and profit from them.348 Until we insist, 
radically perhaps, that precedent here gets it wrong, and that protections 
against Non-Consensual Pornography are possible,349 then we further 
the reality that “[n]o government, yet, is in the pornography business. . 
. This has not been necessary since no man who wants pornography 
[Non-Consensual Pornography or otherwise] encounters serious trouble 
getting it, regardless of obscenity laws [and the criminalization of Non-
Consensual Pornography].”350 The difficult, necessary work before us 
is to imagine reform that animates inherent dignity and worth concepts 
that are non-positional, but universal and unalienable. 
                                                 
347 Digital Millennium Copyright Act § 202, 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2012) (only 
outlawing copyright infringement). Another law would be necessary to 
provide a vehicle for take down requests. Internet can be free space to use 
images and critique another, even a non-consenting other, but not where 
commentary on naked body and sex is involved. 
348 cnbc.com, Things Are Looking Up in America’s Porn Industry, NBC NEWS BUS. 
(Jan. 20, 2015, 8:17 AM), http://www.nbcnews.com/business/business-news/things-
are-looking-americas-porn-industry-n289431. 
349Fair Housing Council of San Fernando Valley v, Roommates.Com, LLC, 521 
F.3d. 1157 (9th Cir. 2008); see also Doe No. 14 v. Internet Brands, Inc., 844 F.3d 
846, 853 (9th Cir. 2016) (stating that “Congress has not provided an all-purpose get 
out-of-jail-free card for businesses that publish user content on the Internet, though 
any claims might have a marginal chilling effect on Internet publishing 
businesses.”); Reuters, Judges Are No Longer Giving Tech Companies an Automatic 
Pass on Civil Liability, FORTUNE (Sep. 02, 2016, 12:26 PM), 
http://fortune.com/2016/08/18/judges-tech-companies/. 
350 MACKINNON, supra note 172, at 239. 
